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Abstract Recent advances in the cryptographic field of “Zero-Knowledge Proofs” have
sparked a new wave of research, giving birth to many exciting theoretical approaches
in the last few years. Such research has often overlapped with the need for private
and scalable solutions of Blockchain-based communities, resulting in the first practical
implementations of such systems. Many of these innovative constructions have developed
in parallel, using different terminologies and evolving into a fragmented ecosystem, calling
for their consolidation into the more stable domain of “Verifiable Computation”. In this
master thesis I propose a unifying Verifiable Computation model for the simplification
and efficient comparison of all cryptographic proof systems. I take advantage of this
model to analyse innovative technologies (Homomorphic Authenticators, Verifiable Delay
Functions) which developed into their own specialised domains, and I attempt to make
them more accessible for newcomers to the field. Furthermore, I expand on the future of
Verifiable Computation, Universal proof compilers and “Proofs of All”, by approaching
the state-of-the-art zk-STARK construction from a more accessible and informal design
perspective.
Thanks To those who supported me in times of need, and to those who gave me
technical advice. In particular: Mamma e Papà, prof. Ligeti, Mathijs, Eszter, István.
Let’s shoot for the moon. If we miss, we’ll still land amongst the stars.
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Objectives
The objective of this MSc thesis is to tackle innovative technologies from a unifying
perspective, prioritising simplicity and understanding over obscure constructions, and
benefitting further popularisation of the cryptographic proofs domain. My main incentive
for writing this thesis is the conflict of interest that exists in the security field between
the desire to exploit innovations in cryptography for building disruptive technologies
(e.g. the “blockchain revolution”1), and the complexity and knowledge barrier required
to understand them, which leads to consistent misinformation in the market (e.g. the
“Bitconnect scandal” [2]) as well as in developer channels, and fragmentation within the
research community.
The domain I target is that of cryptographic proof systems, and, specifically, I gather
them under the umbrella term “Verifiable Computation”. There are 3 thesis objectives
which this work hopes to achieve:
1. A Unifying Model
for the cryptographic Verifiable Computation domain. The idea is to select and define
the most important and comprehensive properties that have been spread out over
various VC technologies in the course of more than 3 decades, sometimes using
different names and definitions, By using a standardised model for defining protocols,
researchers can attempt to merge the fragmented domain of cryptographic proofs,
and thus unite their efforts under a single research domain.
2. Technical Analysis
of VC technologies, revisiting exciting and correlated protocols using the unifying
model. While the focus is kept only on more favoured constructions of recent years, I
wish to help new researchers get quickly acquainted with the VC landscape, hopefully
leading to further popularisation and systemisation of the domain.
3. A Simplified Guide
to understanding the VC domain and its prominent technologies. This “layman’s
view” of core cryptographic properties is achieved through uncompromisingly logical
and verbose debates on each technical design, where no assumptions are left to
the imagination. While there are many formal definitions used to organise tech-
nical details, they are always accompanied by informal descriptions. I believe in
simplifying technical constructions as much as possible, as it is paramount to their
implementation and diffusion in the engineering field; it also stimulates further
research, as the cryptocurrency community has proven[3].
1for a list of companies currently investing in blockchain, see [1]
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Contents
This thesis is divided into 3 chapters, which reflect the objectives set forth during the
development of this work. Chapter I, ”Introduction and VC Model”, discusses the
history behind proof protocols while giving a gentle introduction to the topic, progressively
presenting my systemising model for understanding and analysing VC protocols and prop-
erties. Chapter II, ”Non-universal VC Protocols”, introduces and gathers currently
expanding and innovative VC technologies (i.e. HAUTHs, VDFs) which have previously
been considered within separate domains, offering a comprehensive analysis under the
model provided in the first chapter. Chapter III, ”Universal VC Compilers”, introduces
to our model and breaks down state-of-art prominent VC technology (i.e. STARKs) which
has yielded groundbreaking results, with the potential to revolutionise the cryptographic
community as well as disrupt the cryptocurrency market itself.
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1 Introduction and VC Model
Throughout the past few decades, our society has put a great deal of effort into developing
technologies upon which to build trusted platforms and services. Along with this explosion
of services, the Internet has brought digital freedom into our daily lives. The latest example
of this is distributed networking (e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum), which aims to replace important
societal functions. This latest trend marks an important milestone of our globalised
society: the time has come to build trustless platforms, built upon technologies we can all
indiscriminately trust.
The services we are speaking of take electronic form and exist only in the realm of
Computer Science, which imposes restrictions on what security and trust really mean,
expressed fundamentally in the form of Cryptography. Cryptography the art, Cryptography
the science, has been developing at an accelerated rate of research ever since human
conflict,1 and the need for trusted communication, has existed. What we deal with in this
thesis is “how to trust someone doing something with some secret data”. That phrase might
seem a little vague, but I promise: it encompasses so many notions of computer science and
cryptography that it extends to virtually any computation on paper or silicon. To define
this domain, I’ll use the term “Verifiable Computation” (or VC).
In order to explain what it means to prove computation, I would like to start by taking
a brief look at the most common form of provably secure computation since the birth
of the Web: Authentication (Section 1.1). Afterwards, I’ll move on to define formally
(and informally) what generic cryptographic proofs entail (Sections 1.2, 1.3); then how to
perform privacy-friendly computations of hidden variables using Zero-Knowledge Proofs
(Section 1.4); then, how to do this without multiple rounds of communication (Section 1.5),
more efficiently and with less communication overheads (Section 1.6), as well as other VC
properties and open questions (Section 1.7). For a discussion on how to put it all together
in a single convenient package, please check Section 3.1.2 in the chapter on Universal
Verifiable Computation.
1.1 Identification Schemes and Authentication
Before we talk about Verifiable Computation, let’s scale down a bit and talk about a simpler
concept: Identification Schemes. The process of authenticating a user, which simply defines
a Prover showing to a Verifier that he knows a specific non-deterministic secret relating to
his publicly known identifier, has roughly evolved under the three following cryptographic
constructions.
1it appears that Caesar was also a big fan of cryptography :)
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1.1.1 Simple Password-based Authentication
In this naïve approach the Verifier doesn’t trust the Prover, so he asks him to send over
the secret password (i.e. “knowledge witness”) so that he may verify it.
Prover
password→ V eri f ier
This is an extremely flawed protocol because:
1. the whole secret is revealed to the Verifier (if the Prover actually knows the password,
that is);
2. and anybody else looking at this conversation;
3. the secret password needs to be well protected and stored by both parties.
The following solutions have been devised to improve this method:
1. N/A (it is a requirement of the protocol);
2. secure unicast communication channels, e.g. HTTPs;
3. the Server stores the password in Hash+Salt format, or Encrypted format. This
helps take stress off hacked servers whose database is compromised, as long as the
hack is detected (otherwise, the webpage can be modified to redirect login attempts).
Another solution is to have an auxiliary check (called Two Factor Authentication, or
2FA) using one-time tokens sent via SMS (or an app); unfortunately this is mainly a
convenient hack invented by the industry to patch up the inherent weaknesses of
this authentication approach, and it is as secure as the device and communication
used to receive the token, as well as the token generation process itself.
Even though Simple Password-based authentication is a very straightforward interaction
(the user types into a text box) it still conveys a false sense of security, leads to many failed
login attempts (due to typing mystakes) as well as poor password generation habits by lazy
or misinformed users.
1.1.2 Challenge-Response Authentication Protocols
In this approach neither party can trust the other, or the communication channel may be
unsafe, so they take advantage of any “hard cryptographic problem” to challenge knowledge
of the secret. Essentially, Asymmetric Encryption and Signature schemes help provers
avoid revealing their secret to malicious verifiers.
Prover
challenge← V eri f ier
Prover
response→ V eri f ier
(where the challenge is a random number chosen by the Verifier, which the Prover must use
to generate as response a unique signature or reveal a random message previously encrypted
by the Verifier.)
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This method is already a huge improvement over the previous one, and yet it has
received very little adoption amongst the most popular Web services, even though it
could easily be implemented through browser plugins and software wallets. In fact, its
most widespread adoption seems to be physical authentication cards, used for traditional
banking transactions at ATMs or for authorising entry to company offices.
There is still one small issue: Challenge-Response protocols still reveal some information,
such as unique signatures or decrypted cipher-texts. While Encryption and Signature
schemes are chosen to leak as little information as possible (e.g. Computationally Indis-
tinguishable from random values), there is still something to be learned from selective
forgery attacks (for signatures) and chosen cipher-text attacks (for encryption); should the
underlying cryptographic scheme be broken, the credentials and privacy of the users might
be compromised.
1.1.3 Zero-Knowledge Identification Protocols
Neither party trusts the other. With this technique exactly nothing about the secret is revealed
to the Verifier, except that it is valid. The secret to achieving this marvellous result lies
within Interactive Proof Systems and their properties, which we will discuss in the rest
of this chapter. A common approach to such protocols is through one or more rounds of
interactivity:
commit step
{
Prover statement→ V eri f ier
round i
Prover
challenge← V eri f ier
Prover
proof→ V eri f ier
Alternatively, there is a field of protocols which performs transparent preprocessing and
then sends off a single large proof to be probabilistically checked offline:
Prover
large proof→ V eri f ier
1.2 Theorem Proving and Interactive Proofs
The roots of Verifiable Computation extend all the way to Theorem Proving, when math-
ematicians still wrote their proofs on paper. If we wish to convert mathematical theorems
to the domain of computer science, we should take a look at the well fleshed out theories of
NP complexity classes; here is an informal definition of NP Theorem Proving:
NP Languages Th ∈NP ⇐⇒ ∃ "witness" w : Th is "easy" to verify using w
Note: You should look at the witness as a sequence of logical deductions which start
from truthful statements and lead all the way to the theorem claim:
axiom(s) =⇒
witness︷ ︸︸ ︷
... =⇒ ... =⇒ ... =⇒ Th
3
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If one part of the sequence is already known to the Prover, the witness represents the
part which is not known.
This definition was extended in 1985 by [4] to represent an Interactive Proof System IP:
IP Languages
Given

PUNBOUNDED,VPOLY ∈ ITM (Interactive Turing Machine)
L⊆ {0,1}∗ ∈NP− lang
n input size, c large constant
w secret witness of P
Then X ∈ L ⇐⇒
∧

Completeness ⇐⇒ ∀ input X ∈ L to (P,V ) : Pr[V accepts X ]≥ 1− 1nc
Soundness ⇐⇒ ∀P ′POLY ∈ ITM∧X ∉ L input to (P ′,V ) : Pr[V accepts X ]≤ 1nc
or ⇐⇒ ∀P ′POLY ∈ ITM∧X ∉ L input to (P ′,V ) :(
Pr[V accepts X ]≥ 1− 1nc =⇒
∃ "Extractor" EPOLY ∈ ITM : ∃R ⊆ {0,1}∗ : E(X )=R(w)
)
(please note that we’ve defined the language as NP, but IP protocols have been shown
to support even more expressive spaces such as PSPACE or even NEXP)
These systems are often called “Proofs (or Protocols) of Knowledge”, because the Com-
pleteness property defines a protocol (i.e. set of rules) to follow in order to accept a given
statement, and the Soundness property implies instead the existence of some sort of “know-
ledge” (also known as “witness”), needed to distinguish right from wrong. The alternative
definition of Soundness, which makes use of an Extractor machine, is typically used to
single out unique Knowledge which is possessed by the Prover, and is useful for under-
standing “Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge”. Here is a more intuitive definition of
those properties:
Completeness if the statement X is valid, then there is an “easy” way to prove it using
the protocol. The Verifier will be able to efficiently check this in polynomial time. In
order words: all valid statements are always accepted.
Soundness if the statement X is false, then there is “almost” no way to prove it. The
Verifier only needs to trust its own knowledge and randomness to disprove false
proofs from an all-powerful Prover. In other words: all invalid statements are always
rejected.
(When discussing the Extractor, the key to understanding the definition is that it
shouldn’t be possible to accept false statements, unless the illegitimate Prover was
somehow capable of extracting the witness, or a relationship on the witness, from the
statement X itself in order to use it.)
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An important security observation to make, especially when considering the second
definition for Soundness, is that there is no restriction to the amount of “knowledge leaked”
by the execution of an IP instance. This essentially means that the Prover could naïvely
just send his secret password (i.e. witness) over, and the protocol might still be valid.
Restrictions on such flaws, as well as the importance of Interactivity, will be added by the
Zero-Knowledge definition.
A second important security observation is that the Soundness property is so vague that
it does not really provide any security guarantee that the statement X ∈ L will be hard
to prove for cheaters, only that it should not be possible to prove X ∉ L. In fact, if the
language L trivial enough, it might even be possible to randomly choose any X ∈ L and
extract the witness required to prove it. Thus, the security of our proof lies entirely within
the chosen language L, which is typically based on some hard cryptographic problem such
as finding the prime factors of a large number.
NOTE: While we’ve defined soundness based on negligible probability, practical construc-
tions only require Pr < 12 , and repetition is employed to achieve the definition above. Also,
almost all practical systems have perfect completeness (Pr = 1).
1.2.1 Probabilistically Checkable Proofs
There is an alternative field of cryptographic proof systems that is roughly equivalent to
IPs, but uses different constructions: Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs). We will
not go into detail regarding PCPs, but suffice to say that they share a lot of similarities
with IPs. The main differences in the definition are minor details regarding specific
cryptographic properties:
• Soundness: it is always computational, since the Prover is computationally (PPOLY )
bounded, just like the Verifier. This is due to the fact that PCPs are not technically
“proof” systems, but “argument”-based systems.
• Non Interactivity: such protocols don’t require any interactivity by default (IPs need
the Fiat-Shamir extension discussed later); instead, the Prover preprocesses the
original language statement to generate a (typically large) proof to send off to the
Verifier for inspection. This notion will be defined in Section 1.5.
• Transparency: such systems do not employ interactivity because everything is pre-
pared in a trustless fashion. The Verifier will be able to use (public) randomness to
analyse a few elements of the given proof. This notion will be defined in Section 1.7.
• Verifier Efficiency: these protocols are required to be efficient by default. This is
due to the groundbreaking results emerging from the PCP Theorem [5]–[8] finalised
in ’98 by Aurora et al., which led to the conferring of the Gödel Prize for multiple
cryptographers having worked on it throughout the 90s. This notion is defined in
Section 1.6 through proof succinctness and verifier scalability.
In practice, PCP systems make heavy use of polynomial arithmetisation, making them
better suited for Universal VC systems, as seen in Chapter 3; IPs, instead, typically focus
on constructions based on specific problem isomorphisms. An extension of PCPs called
5
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Interactive Oracle Proofs (IOPs) [9], which combines them with IPs, can be found in
state-of-the-art Universal VC systems and I mention it in Section 3.1.7).
1.3 Types of Knowledge
The issue with most weak cryptographic authentication methods is that some uniquely
identifiable knowledge about the secret is somehow “leaked” during the authentication
process. Intuitively, we would like to reduce this “knowledge leakage” as much as possible.
In order to do so, we must first understand what possessing “knowledge” truly means. Let
us define two major scenarios where knowledge is typically conveyed:
1. Communication:
the Prover has chosen (or is in possession of) some non-deterministic private value
which the Verifier needs to solve some other publicly known problem (likely published
by the Prover and verified by a Trusted Authority). The only way for this value to be
known is through the Prover himself.
2. Computation:
the Verifier would like to extract some knowledge from a given hard problem, but is
too computationally bounded to be able to do so. Given enough computational power,
any Prover would be able to extract the required knowledge and convey it to the
Verifier.
Knowledge seems to be strictly related to the act of communicating some value which is
the result of a computation that was either too difficult or even impossible for the Verifier
to perform. In other words, knowledge is transferred between two communicating parties
if and only if the output of their interaction was the result of an infeasible computation for
one or both of the parties.2 Here is an informal definition:
Knowledge Complexity KC
Given

PUNBOUNDED,VPOLY ∈ ITM
L ∈ IP(P,V )
f :N→N∧ f non-decreasing
n input size
Then KCL( f (n)) ⇐⇒ ∧
{
i. X ∈ L, X only input to(P,V )
ii. P"communicates"≤ f (n) bits of "knowledge"
Whenever we have KCL(0), that means we can only convey one bit of knowledge with
our protocol: X
?∈ L.
2An interesting note here is that transferring random bits does not typically convey any information, since
any party can generate randomness by itself (being an ITM). This may seem counterintuitive, but those
random bits would only convey knowledge if related to some pre-defined public statement or problem which
the Verifier cannot solve by himself.
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1.4 Zero-Knowledge Interactive Proofs
If we embed KCL(0) into the notion of IP, we get the following:
ZKIP Languages
Given
{
PUNBOUNDED,VPOLY ∈ ITM (Interactive Turing Machine)
L⊆ {0,1}∗ ∈NP− lang
Then X ∈ L ⇐⇒
∧

Completeness
Soundness
Zero-Knowledge
⇐⇒ ∀V ′POLY ∈ ITM : ∃ "Simulator" SPOLY ∈ ITM : Tx(S(V ′))≈Tx(P,V )
=⇒ Deniability
Or, more intuitively:
Zero-Knowledge The idea is that no extra knowledge can be extracted from a legitimate
valid interaction (i.e. leading to an accepting state), as long as it is “indistinguish-
able” from a forged valid interaction. In fact, there should be an efficient Simulator
algorithm to simulate a valid interaction’s transaction record Tx even when the simu-
lating Verifier V ′ doesn’t have access to the Prover’s real witness. The Simulator can
generate Tx(S(V ′)) either by executing many protocol runs until an accepting state
is met, or just by deducing the correct statement X starting from any final accepting
state (known as “rewind-ability”). I will elaborate later on what “indistinguishable”
(i.e. ≈) means in Section 1.4.2.
The reason that this simulator-based definition leads to privacy-friendly (i.e. non
witness-leaking) protocols is because there can be no witness Extractor for legitim-
ate transcripts, since they’re indistinguishable from forged transcripts, which are
assumed to lack any witness at all. In other words: the protocol’s soundness needs to
rely entirely on interactivity and randomness!
Zero-Knowledge also implies Deniability:
Deniability A Transaction record from a valid ZKIP interaction does not constitute an
independent proof of knowledge. No external third parties can watch (or be given) a
valid ZKIP communication and infer that the Prover really has a witness for X ∈ L,
because the interaction may have been simulated. Only the original parties of the
ZKIP communication can verify that it is indeed legitimate, because they know that
the messages were not forged when challenging each other.
The trick to actually achieving Zero-Knowledge in a meaningful manner lies within the
combination of Interactivity and Randomness. The two parties cannot use a Challenge-
Response protocol, because the response to the challenged question is rather unique,
7
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regardless of the chosen challenge. However, if the response were to be randomly selected
(i.e. challenged) out of a random distribution of values selected by the Prover, it would
not contain any meaningful information. In order for such a protocol to be sound, only a
legitimate Prover would be always able to calculate the required response: a deterministic
relationship (selected using the Verifier’s random challenge) on a statement Y , randomly
derived from the original statement X .3 Interactivity is required because, regardless of
the chosen challenge, the Prover’s set needs to be random for each protocol execution.
Finally, the same security assumption of IPs apply to ZKIPs: the difficulty of proving
X ∈ L lies in the chosen language L and its cryptographic hardness assumptions.
NOTE: alternative definitions have been used in the past to describe zero-knowledge, such
as “witness preservation” and “witness indistinguishability”, but the one given here is the
strongest one and the current standard.
NOTE2: if you would like an alternative informal explanation of ZKIP protocols, I highly
recommend the beautiful paper by Quisquater et al. [10] on the metaphor of the “Ali Baba
Cave”. One important feasibility result for ZKIP proofs, based on finding Hamiltonian
cycles in graphs, was given by Blum in 1986 [11].
1.4.1 ZKIP as a solution to malicious actors
Zero-Knowledge proofs are regarded as being an extremely powerful tool to convert mali-
cious actors into semi-honest actors. A researcher first builds a protocol which is shown
to be secure when all parties (or eavesdroppers) are semi-honest (i.e. they always follow
the protocol’s rules); then, any party sending messages is required to provide proofs that
they were generated following protocol requirements. Since each proof is Zero-Knowledge,
the security of the original protocol is not compromised. Because each message must be
accompanied by a proof, malicious attackers have no choice but follow the rules of the
protocol, or just abort. While there is a computational cost to be paid per proof, Universal
VC systems (discussed in Chapter 3) are a convenient and efficient solution for adding
such capabilities.
1.4.2 Types of Zero-Knowledge
We previously defined a Simulator capable of generating fake valid protocol which are also
indistinguishable from legitimate valid runs: Tx(S(V ′))≈Tx(P,V ).
There are currently 4 different classifications of indistinguishability (≈):
1. Perfect: there exists a Simulator which produces communication transcripts identic-
ally distributed to the legitimate distribution of valid transcripts between (P,V ).
2. Statistical: there exists a Simulator which produces communication transcripts
identically distributed to the legitimate distribution of valid transcripts between
(P,V ), except for a constant (i.e. “small”) number of exceptions.
3there can also be multiple Y statements derived from X at the same time, for efficiency purposes.
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3. Computational (default): there exists a Simulator which produces communication
transcripts not-identically distributed to the legitimate transcripts produced between
(P,V ), but it is believed to be computationally infeasible to detect such differences.
4. Not Known (No Use): there does not exist a Simulator but the communication
Transactions are still believed to leak nothing about the witness.
NOTE: the “Not Known” type of indistinguishability does not satisfy full Zero-Knowledge
requirements, and it also implies Non-Deniability. See the next section.
1.5 Non Interactivity and Digital Signature Algorithms
We have covered the basics of Zero-Knowledge Proofs, and we’ve seen that two essential as-
pects are randomness and interactivity. Well, what if the Prover and Verifier’s interactivity
in the real world is effectively limited? For example, they may not be online at the same
moment, or the Prover might want to pre-process multiple proofs by himself. Is it even
possible to have “Non-Interactive” Zero-Knowledge Proofs (NIZK)?
In 1987 an article by Israeli researchers Fiat and Shamir [12] proposed a heuristic to
solve the aforementioned problem. The key takeaway here is that, while Zero-Knowledge is
not deemed to exist without Interactivity, we can adopt the famous Random Oracle Model
(ROM) [13] assumption to make use of an interacting “oracle” party which will supply us
with “public-coin” random challenges for our protocol. If we assume that cryptographic
Hash functions correctly implement a Random Oracle, we can employ them as universal
and passive Verifiers to participate in our proof, thus obtaining:
Fiat-Shamir Heuristic the Verifier selects a challenge e = H(pp), where H is a strong
cryptographic hash function implementing a Public-Coin Random Oracle, and pp are
the public parameters of the problem and the current protocol execution (including
the Prover’s randomness)
As can be easily be understood, everyone with the same Hash function also has access
to the same challenges. Which means that they can validate the lack of bias within the
selection of random challenges, hence the legitimacy of the proof. Since this check can be
performed independently after the execution of a NIZK, once the recorded communication
trace is given the proof can essentially be verified by anybody. This is what it means for
the protocol to become “Non-Interactive”, while still retaining Interactivity in the ROM
model.
On a final security note, while the lack of bias in the selection of challenges is apparent,
the challenges are still selected based on the Prover’s random inputs. These can be biased
and, since interactivity is outsourced to the Oracle, an illegitimate Prover can mount an
offline attack to keep simulating protocol runs until he finds lucky challenges he can
satisfy. Therefore, to prevent cheating from the Prover, we must exponentially decrease the
error rate for Soundness to brute-force levels (i.e. ² = 2−256 ⇐⇒ Pr[V accepts X ] ≤ 12256 ).
This would imply that if a Prover does not have unlimited resources (like in a real-life
scenario, but unlike the formal ZKIP definition), then he should not be able to come up
with a simulated NIZK valid protocol run.
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1.5.1 Flawed NIZK Zero-Knowledge and Non-Deniability
The last remark noted that we’re preventing Provers from being able to simulate protocol
runs. Does this also mean that the Zero-Knowledge property is broken? Well, yes, but
actually no. There does not seem to be a definitive answer in the cryptographic community
as to whether Zero-Knowledge is truly preserved for the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (a good
debate on this can be found in [14]), but KCL(0) is believed to hold as long as the ROM
model holds. The Zero-Knowledge property for a Fiat-Shamir NIZK is currently classified
as “Not Known” (see the relevant subsection).
As an important consequence of the fact that NIZK proofs can be validated by anybody
with a transcript of the communication, the Deniability property is broken:
NIZK =⇒ Non-Deniability 6=⇒ Deniability
This has the downside that any third parties can detect whether a proof was legitimate or
not. While this may not seem like such a big deal, uniquely identifying logins (i.e. Identity
Proofs) in censorship states can pose a real threat to human rights. It is best to use
pseudonymous identities and de-anonymising networks when using NIZK technology
(e.g. ZCash) under such harsh regimes.
1.5.2 Digital Signature Algorithm construction
An important upside of NIZKs of Knowledge is that they can be extended from one-shot
Identification Schemes to one-shot Digital Signature Algorithms!
DSA Fiat-Shamir Heuristic the Verifier selects a challenge e=H(pp,m), where all para-
meters are the same as the standard Fiat-Shamir Heuristic, and m is the message
that the Prover wants to sign.
The “signature” is, of course, actually just a proof of Knowledge which ties the Identific-
ation proof to the presence of a specific message in the Verifier’s challenge. This suffices
to show that the Prover knows the witness for his identity, and that he is committing to
using randomness (i.e. challenges) derived from a specific message.
1.6 Performance through Scalability
Over the years, as cryptographers struggled to develop Zero-Knowledge VC protocols for
practical use cases, a few more properties on performance requirements were devised4.
These properties are especially relevant for comparison of recent Universal VC systems,
such as the ones mentioned in Section 3.2, which tend to make compromises in the name
of expressiveness.
If outsourcing verifiable computations is to be seen as a commodity, then they have to
be fast to verify. This requirements boils down to two main properties: there should be
an exponential gap between the protocol execution complexity of the Prover and Verifier
4A result of this approach can be seen in the the PCP field of proof protocols.
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(where the Verifier takes less time), and the proof size should be small enough that the
Verifier can read it. Furthermore, Provers of the past often required hundreds of gigabytes
and weeks just to process simple proofs, we’d like to avoid that as well. Formally:
Fully Scalable Proof
Given

PPOLY,VPOLY ∈ ITM (Interactive Turing Machine)
(x, y, f )= X ∈ L,
y= f (x), Oy(∆)
,
Then X ∈ L =⇒ ∧

Completeness
Soundness
Prover Scalability ⇐⇒ OP (∆+ pol ylog(∆))
Verifier Scalability ⇐⇒ OV (pol ylog(∆))
Proof Succinctness ⇐⇒ ∀pi=Tx(P,V ) : O|pi|(pol ylog(|x|))
Intuitively, we want to validate proofs pi much faster than it takes the Verifier to
actually check the statement himself, and without excessive overhead for the Prover.
Also, the communication complexity for such protocols should be always be well within
acceptable standards.
It is important to note that most protocols don’t achieve such results, so the actual
definitions are typically relaxed based on the current best solution in that field. For
the STARK protocol analysed in this thesis I’ll use as satisfying prover-scalability
requirement a quasilinear Prover OP (∆ · pol ylog(∆)), which can yield acceptable
concrete performance results in most cases.
NOTE: often verifier-scalability and proof-succinctness are regarded together as “verifier
efficiency”. For extra confusion, sometimes researchers also use the term “succinctness” to
refer to one or both properties, or just scalability in general. Sometimes a fully scalable
system is called doubly scalable, or just scalable.
1.7 Other VC Properties
Finally, some further non-essential but highly appreciated properties are added, which
increase the reliability and flexibility of a proof system, allowing it to be used in more
demanding use-cases:
Transparency Tx(P ←V ) ∈ public random coins ; i.e. the Verifier only ever sends messages
taken from a randomness source that is also available to the Prover.
This property was first conceived with Arthur-Merlin (AM) protocols ([15], [16]),
which were proven to be equivalent in expressiveness to IP protocols that had
separate randomness sources for the two parties; it was first called “transparency”
in [17]. Transparency is typically present in all PCP-family protocols.
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The reason that this property is “transparent” is because as long as the Prover and
Verifier have access to the same randomness source, there can be no trusted or
trapdoor-derived setup for the underlying protocol5. Because trust is eliminated, the
security of the protocol cannot be compromised as it does not depend on any specific
party, only mathematics. Transparency has also become a matter of interest lately,
due to the increased popularity of zk-SNARK constructions (see Section 3.2), which
are infamous for their trusted setups and less suitable for decentralised, trustless
settings.
Universality L ⇐⇒ NP− lang ; i.e. the protocol language supports statements taken from
any NP computation.
This property is extremely useful for implementing basic cryptographic proving
primitives that can be applied to computations of Turing-complete machines. The
utility of such Universal VC protocols lies with the convenience of being able to
freely design an application, and then automatically generate proofs for the actions
performed by said application. This topic is widely discussed in Chapter 3.
Post-Quantum Safety the protocol makes use of cryptographic assumptions which are not
shown to be compromised by Quantum algorithms.
Finally, a couple of open questions which have been less (if at all) studied in popular
VC constructions:
Composition the proofs of different statements can be efficiently combined, or extended
into more complex ones.
Multi-Party a single proof can be generated using multiple inputs taken from different
Provers. Achieving such a property for Zero-Knowledge protocols would be akin to
achieving Multi-Party Computation.
5all setups are either deterministic, or public-coin non-deterministic.
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In the decades leading up to the introduction of practical Universal VCs, most protocols
only dealt with either secret proving or specialised computational proofs. Common tools
to achieve this were either Interactivity (and isomorphic problems) or Homomorphic
Encryption, or both. In this chapter I will evaluate two innovative fields of cryptography
which have a strong correlation with universal VC solutions: Homomorphic Authenticators
and Verifiable Delay Functions. While they have mostly been developed under different
contexts, they share many of the fundamental properties introduced in the VC Model
chapter. Homomorphic Authenticators deal with outsourced (homomorphic) computation
and VDFs deal with scalable computation; both yield interesting protocols which can be
adapted, with a little expertise, into practical ad-hoc applications.
I will carefully evaluate the properties achieved by each construction, trying to under-
stand the cryptographic design behind it without sacrificing the simplicity of our VC Model.
This aim of this chapter is to alleviate the fragmentation and complexity of the fields which
stand below Universal VC solutions, showing that they can be useful starting points for
achieving richer VC constructions. Further non-universal VC protocols will be discussed in
the conclusive remarks of this chapter.
2.1 Homomorphic Authenticators
Homomorphic Authenticators (HAUTHs) stem from an interesting and active area of
research, with recent publications being in 2018. The incipit of this field lies with Ho-
momorphic Signature schemes, which were originally rejected by cryptographers due to
their implicit susceptibility to forgery attacks. These schemes were brought up again
by Rivest, and formalised by Johnson et al in 2002[18], to include better definitions for
security against forger (i.e. Random Forgery attacks).
Multiple researchers followed down this path, coming up with innovative constructions
for validating outsourced computations (e.g. cloud computing). An initially successful
design [19] (in terms of VC features) relied on fully homomorphic MAC constructions
using polynomials. These MACs would then be sent to a server (i.e. Prover), which would
leverage their homomorphic properties to generate computational proofs on the given
data. This way, homomorphism can be used to yield valid isomorphic problems, akin to
the concepts introduced in Chapter 1. The big advantages of this technique, compared
to IPs, are: outsourced proving, proof composition, and efficiency for really big problem
sizes. In fact, a core feature of Hom.Authenticators is that a Prover can upload really large
databases to the Verifier, and then delete them; the Authenticators themselves will be
sufficient to verify the validity of any computation on this data.
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The polynomial-based construction was then extended by [20] to support inputs for
multiple clients, which would grant a simil multi-party property. This was achieved by
adding a form of homomorphism to the keys themselves, and then allowing the Verifiers
to merge them during the verification phase. Other forms of publicly verifiable schemes
were provided (based on lattices), but they proved to be very complex and inefficient.
In order to make the construction more practical, Fiore et al.[21] managed to achieve
verifier scalability, albeit sacrificing the universality of the protocol. This modification
used a combination of polynomials and additive group schemes with bilinear pairings for
multiplication. Finally, public verifiability and zero-knowledge were added just now in
2018 by Schabhüser et al.[22]. Public verifiability is achieved by building a homomorphic
signature scheme out of the homomorphic MACs; simil ZK was achieved through a property
known as “context-hiding”.
In this section I will provide the following content: an overview of Homomorphic Au-
thenticator protocols and commonly used syntax for this field (Section 2.1.1); the basic
homomorphic components behind them (Section 2.1.2); a basic MAC construction construc-
tion (Section 2.1.3); an extension to multiple clients participating in the protocol (Section
2.1.4); and finally support for verifier scalability (Section 2.1.5).
2.1.1 Protocol Syntax
Let’s consider the protocol as a 3-step proof, which makes it simpler to compare it with
other VC technologies. We wish to prove f (x)= y, the construction is as follows:
client V eri f ier
σx−→ server Prover
client V eri f ier
σy←− server Prover
check(σy)
?=True
Here is the sequence of steps which the parties go through, in a basic construction:
1. Preparing the Authenticator: The Verifier needs to convert his message x into a
Homomorphic Authenticator σx, which is a MAC or Signature made using a secret
key sk. First, the client generates a unique label L relating to the message x,
e.g. “message #1” or “message x on time 10:54”. The label is then converted into a
random value r, required for the security of the scheme, using a keyed one-way PRF1
r← PRFK (L)
A Homomorphic MAC (HMAC) is typically built using polynomial interpolation:
σx ← p= (p0, p1)= (x, (r− x)/sk)= Interpolate((0, x), (sk, r))
with p(i)= p0+ p1 i
1for example, a seeded PRNG constructed from a keyed cryptographic hash function such as Keccak256[23]
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Since it’s more common to define a function as composition of multiple inputs,
i.e. f (x1, x2, ...)= y, then this HMAC interpolation process can be repeated for each
input message, and each message xi will be associated with a different label L i:
σx ← (σ1,σ2, ...)= (p1, p2, ...)
2. Generating an Authenticator-based proof: The Prover then uses the
MAC/Signature scheme to convert function f into a sequence of homomorphic
operations on σx. After these operations have been performed, they will yield a valid
MAC/Signature σy, which is considered as proof for this protocol. First, the server
converts the function f into a Turing-complete sequence of HMAC operations, e.g. f+
or f× for the polynomial construction.
f =⇒ ( f+, f×, ...)
These operations are applied in sequence to σx, with a resulting Authenticator
polynomial called σy:
σy ← ( f+, f×, ...)(σx)
3. Verifying the proof’s validity: The Verifier uses the protocol’s verification func-
tion, this is a crucial step in the construction of the protocol which establishes our
soundness property. To verify whether a given σx is a valid Authenticator polynomial,
the client needs to check whether evaluation on the secret key sk yields a value
consistent with the input label(s):
σx(sk)
?= r
(we will discuss why in detail later.) Which means that any homomorphic derivate of
σx will necessarily yield an equivalent homomorphic derivate of r when evaluated
on sk:
σy(sk)
?= f (r)
For compatibility’s sake, and to help newcomers to the field follow the original papers bet-
ter, let us also display the domain-specific syntax for the Homomorphic Authenticators
domain2:
(sk, ek)←K eygen(λ)
σi ← Auth(sk,mi,L i)
σ←Eval(ek, f ,σi...)
{0,1}←V er(sk, f ,L i...,σ,mi...)
In the next subsections, we will see how to enhance this simple protocol to include
multiple VC features.
2ek is a protocol-abstracted evaluation key, but it is not typically present in most constructions and it can be
representative of the public scheme parameters; σi is computed for each input message mi .
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2.1.2 Adding Completeness
As described in the previous section, we seek full homomorphism in order to achieve
completeness:
Homomorphism a Signature/MAC scheme Sig is operator ¯ homomorphic
⇐⇒ ∃ operator ⊗ : y= Sig(x)∧ y′ = Sig(x′) =⇒ y⊗ y′ = Sig(x¯ x′)
Full Homomorphism a signature/MAC scheme Sig is fully homomorphic
⇐⇒ additivel y homomorphic∧multiplicativel y homomorphic
⇐⇒ ∃⊕ operator ,¯ operator : y= Sig(x)∧ y′ = Sig(x′)
=⇒ y¯ y′ = Sig(x · x′)∧ y⊕ y′ = Sig(x+ x′)
Finding a fully homomorphic scheme is essential to achieve universality, so the re-
searchers found a mathematical object (polynomials) which supported both additive and
multiplicative composition, and then built an authentication scheme on top of it. Given
c ∈Z and polynomials p and q such that{
p= (p0, p1, ...) ∈ F[x]
(
with n= degree(p), |p| = n+1) ⇐⇒ p(x)=∑ni=0 pi · xi
q ∈ F[x] (with m= degree(q))
, the following additive and multiplicative polynomial operators are given:
p+ q def= ∀max(n,m)i=0 pi+ qi
p+ c def= (p0+ c, ∀ni=1 pi)
p× q def= ∀n+mi=0
i∑
j=0
p j · qi− j
p× c def= ∀ni=0 pi · c
Of course, these two operations are only a minor part out of all those which have been
defined by mathematicians in the coming ages; however, it is a widely known Computer
Science fact that these two operations suffice to describe any boolean circuit, and thus fully
homomorphic signature schemes are Turing-complete.
Now that we’ve defined the basic building blocks for our protocol, let’s show that these
two operations hold for any polynomial evaluation:
Completeness
p(x)+ q(x)=
n∑
i=0
pixi+
m∑
i=0
qixi =
min(n,m)∑
0
pixi+
max(n,m)∑
min(n,m)+1
pixi+
min∑
0
qixi+
max∑
min+1
qixi
=
min∑
0
pixi+ qixi+
max∑
min+1
pixi+ qixi =
max∑
0
pixi+ qixi =
max∑
0
(pi+ qi)xi = (p+ q)(x)
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and
p(x) · q(x)=
n∑
0
pixi+
m∑
0
qixi =
n∑
0
m∑
0
pixi · q jx j =
n∑
0
m∑
0
pi qixi+ j
= . . . =
n+m∑
0
(
xi ·
i∑
0
p j · qi− j
)
= (pq)(x)
2.1.3 Adding Soundness
Our interest here lies in two considerations:
1. building a MAC out of polynomials
2. making sure that we can take advantage of the operations explained in the previous
section to achieve a fully homomorphic MAC
Since preserving the full homomorphism is important, we can start from step (2) and
build our way towards step (1). Let’s consider the following relationships on polynomials:
p(x)+ q(x)= (p+ q)(x)
p(x) · q(x)= (pq)(x) ⇐⇒
Eval(x, p)+Eval(x, q)=Eval(x, p+ q)
Eval(x, p) ·Eval(x, q)=Eval(x, pq)
If we tried to represent this as a more traditional Encryption/Signature scheme, it might
look like this:
Sig(sk, p)+Sig(sk, q)= Sig(sk, p+ q)
Sig(sk, p) ·Sig(sk, q)= Sig(sk, pq)
We can, therefore, understand that we should use the secret key instead of the x-
coordinate, and the homomorphisms should still hold. Thanks to the Completeness proper-
ties achieved above, operating on a polynomial has the effect of operating on all its points at
the same time; which means that interpolating two polynomials on the same x-coordinates
allows us to combine them to operate on their y-coordinates:
p= Interpolate((0,m1)(1,m2)(2,m3))
q= Interpolate((0,m4)(1,m5)(2,m6))
(p+ q)(0)=m1+m4
(p+ q)(1)=m2+m5
(p · q)(2)=m3 ·m6
=⇒
σp = Interpolate((sk,m1))
σq = Interpolate((sk,m2))
(σp+σq)(sk)=σp(sk)+σq(sk)=m1+m2
(σp ·σq)(sk)=σp(sk) ·σq(sk)=m1 ·m2
The polynomial σp is already very close to a homomorphic MAC (sk is the secret key, and
m1 is the message being signed), but we mustn’t disclose the sk x-coordinate to anyone.
There are two problem:
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1. if we disclose the message being signed, something usually allowed by signature and
MAC schemes, then someone could figure out our secret key sk.3
2. to protect against oracle attacks we should add randomness to the scheme (as well
as prove that it is secure against Random Forgery).
To address both problems at the same time, we will move the message m to a known
x-coordinate, while using a random value for our sk x-coordinate:
σ= Interpolate((0,m), (sk, r))
It is paramount to avoid disclosing r, so it must always be stored privately by the signer and
associated with the message being signed. Since this is often an inconvenient constraint for
the user of MAC, the user instead chooses a unique label L associated with the signature
on m at that specific point in time (e.g. “m || time”), and randomises it using a keyed
one-way PRF (e.g. a cryptographic PRNG or a keyed cryptographic hash function). The
following is the HMAC construction for signing (m, L) using private keys (sk, K):
r = PRFK (L)
σ= Interpolate((0,m), (sk, r))
This construction is also shown in [19] to be secure (sound) against Random Forgery
attacks, as long as the label L is never re-used.
Please note that, since our signatures are still just polynomials, our completeness
property from the previous section still holds:
σ1 ← Interpolate((0,m1), (sk, r1))∧ r1 ← PRFK (L1)
σ2 ← Interpolate((0,m2), (sk, r2))∧ r2 ← PRFK (L2)
}
=⇒ (σ1+σ2)(0)=σ1(0)+σ2(0)=m1+m2
(σ1 ·σ2)(sk)=σ1(sk)+σ2(sk)= r1 · r2
2.1.4 Adding Multiple Clients
In order to support multiple clients, we will have to change both the homomorphism and
the MAC constructions. For the new homomorphism, we will take advantage of another
property about polynomials: they can be multi-variate. In fact, a polynomial p(x) can
support full-homomorphism just as much as p(x, y) can. This is intuitive if you remap x as
a composition between two other variables. Given c ∈Z and univeriate polynomials p and
q {
p= (p0, p1, ...) ∈ F[x]
(
with n= degree(p), |p| = n+1) ⇐⇒ p(x)=∑ni=0 pi · xi
q ∈ F[y] (with m= degree(q))
3as long as the degree of the polynomial is higher than 0, which we will see is a useful thing to have
18
2.1 Homomorphic Authenticators
, the following additive and multiplicative polynomial operators are given:
p+ q def= ∀max(n,m)i=0 pi+ qi (for missing values, pi = 0 and qi = 0),
with max(m,n)= degree(p+ q), |p+ q| = 2max(m,n))
p+ c def= same as univariate homomorphism
p× q def= ∀n+mi=0 ∀ij=0 p j · qi− j (coefficients for x j yI− j),
with m+n= degree(p× q), |p× q| = |m+n|2
p× c def= same as univariate homomorphism
Note: the size of the multiplicative homomorphism result can be further compressed down
to |p× q| =∑m+n0 i+1=m2+n2, and even more using techniques described in [20]
Now that we have modified our polynomials (while still retaining completeness) we can
construct a Multi-Key Fully-Homomorphic MAC out of different separate keys:
σp = InterpolateX ((sk1,m1))
σq = InterpolateY ((sk2,m2))
(σp+σq)(sk1, sk2)=σp(sk1)+σq(sk2)=m1+m2
(σpσq)(sk1, sk2)=σp(sk1)∗σq(sk2)=m1 ·m2
Clearly both keys are required for the final evaluation step, hence, verification of any
signature requires that the Verifiers share their secret keys, or perform a MPC computation;
Fiore et al. [20] take the simpler approach, and have the parties share all the secrets.
Because of this, scheme is actually a MAC and not a digital signature, just like the previous
construction. If we group the keys like sk= (sk1, sk2), we can perform the evaluation on
the keys exactly like the main protocol syntax requires.
Of course, we should harden our primitive MAC using the same randomisation process
as before, revealing only the signed message for the 0 x-coordinate:
r = PRFK i (L)
σi = Interpolate((0,m), (ski, r))
If we wish to adjust the syntax to the final step of the protocol, it’ll look like this:
sk= (sk0, sk1, ..., sklast party) (all participants)
r = (r0, r1, ..., rlast message) (all messages)
σy(sk)
?= f (r)
This construction is also shown to be sound in [20], in a way that is similar to the previous
one.
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2.1.5 Adding Verifier Scalability
The scheme obtained so far has a lot of nice properties, such as outsourced proving and
support for large inputs, but it imposes a big toll on the Verifier: the client must compute
the function on an alternative set of inputs (the labels) each time he wishes to validate a
computation. In short, the scheme is not verifier scalable. In this step, we will essentially
change the construction of our Hom.MAC into [21], incorporating polynomials into additive
groups. Before we do that, however, let’s consider what we’re going to need: amortisation.
2.1.5.1 What is Amortisation?
The final verification step, essentially, requires receiving the evaluated Authenticator σy
from the Prover, and then checking it against a constant f (r) evaluated by the Verifier.
Wouldn’t it be nice to re-use f (r) for multiple executions of the protocol?
Unfortunately, security assumptions from [19] for the soundness of our basic HMAC
require that r always be randomly chosen, even for multiple signatures on the same
message — therefore, L needs to be randomly chosen as well. What we can do is split L
into a changing part ∆, and a constant part l: L= (l,∆); this is also called a “Multi-Label”
by the authors. These multi-labels might look a little like this:
• L = (”message m”,”at time 12:54”), so that f can be computed on messages of the
same nature (i.e. index in a database), but changing over time; or
• L= (“message m at time 8am”,”on day 08/12/2019”), so that f can be computed on
the same set of messages (i.e. a single row indexed in a database), but changing over
dates.
While f (r)= f (PRFK (L)) will still change across multiple execution runs, we might find
a way to precompute C = f (PRFK (l)), and then efficiently add the component ∆ later on:
f (r)= Load(C,∆)
Assuming the function Load has an exponentially lower complexity than f , the check
should also be verifier scalable.
In order to actually build the Load function, we’ll have to somehow pull the ∆ out of f :
f (r)= f (PRFK (L))= f (PRFK ((l,∆))) =⇒ ∃ f ′ : f ′(PRFK (l),∆)= Load( f (PRFK (l),∆)
This act of “pulling out” a value is exactly what full homomorphism allows us to achieve
for a function g:
∃g′ : E(g(x, y))= g′(E(x),E(y))
Unfortunately, while f may operate on polynomials, L is not one. In fact, even PRF
operates on specific values (you may think of them as numbers, but a string is also valid
input to a hash function), and returns a value as well. In order to “pull ∆ out”, we will
perform two tricks:
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1. transform l into a 1st degree polynomial, whose variable represents ∆
2. convert PRF into its equivalent sequence of operators PRF ′ for the homomorphic
signature scheme
We can then evaluate this polynomial on ∆:
Load( f (PRFK (l),∆)
de f= f (PRF ′K (l))(∆)
While this approach certainly works, PRF ′ would probably be cumbersome to evaluate on
polynomials, especially when PRF is actually a keyed hash-function such as Keccak256[23].
Instead, the researchers came up with a more efficient construction, which manages to
first evaluate the PRF on simple values, and then convert it into a polynomial:
1.
r1 = PRF1K (l)
r2 = PRF2K (∆)
PRFK ((l,∆))
def= r1⊕ r2
4 PRF1 and PRF2 are defined similarly to the original PRF
2. transform r1 into a 1st degree polynomial whose variable represents ∆
3. convert PRF into its equivalent sequence of operators PRF ′ for the homomorphic
signature scheme
4. The new check becomes (after amortisation):
r1
amortised= PRF1K (l)
r2 = PRF2K (∆)
f (r)= Load(r1, r2)= PRF ′(r1, r2)
σy(sk)
?= f (r)
The construction provided by the authors for PRF ′ requires the use of additive groups,
therefore we will adapt the rest of our homomorphism construction to this requirement.
2.1.5.2 Amortized Completeness
Now that we have obtained amortisation, we just need to move our previous HMAC, based
on polynomials, to an additive group G:
σ
def= Interpolate((0,m)(sk, r))= p= (p0, p1)= (m, (r−m)/sk)
⇐⇒ σG def= InterpolateG((0,m)(sk, r))= pG = (gp0 , gp1)= (gm, g(r−m)/sk)
4the actual operation to merge PRF1 and PRF2 is not really a XOR, but another trickery defined on top of
additive groups. The cost for PRF ′ is O f amortised(|r1|), so O(1) for the 2nd degree restriction that was
added by the authors, as we will see later.
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As can be seen, we just simply move all the polynomial coefficients into the group gener-
ator’s exponent. All polynomial homomorphisms only need to work on the exponents; given
c ∈Z and polynomials p and q:{
pG = (gp0 , gp1 , ...) ∈G[x]
(
with n= deg(pG), |pG| = n+1
)
qG ∈G[x]
(
with m= deg(qG)
)
the following additive and multiplicative group-polynomial operators are given:
p+ q def= ∀max(n,m)i=0 pi+ qi
p+ c def= (p0+ c, ∀ni=1 pi)
p · q def= ∀n+mi=0
i∑
j=0
p j · qi− j
p× c def= ∀ni=0 pi · c
=⇒
pG+ qG def= ∀max(n,m)i=0 gpi+qi =∀
max(n,m)
i=0 (g
pi · gqi )
pG+ c def= (gp0+c,∀ni=1 gpi )= ((gpo )c,∀ni=1 gpi )
pG · qG def= ∀n+mi=0
i∑
j=0
gp j ·qi− j =∀n+mi=0
i∑
j=0
(gp j )qi− j
=∀n+mi=0
i∑
j=0
(gpi )dlog(g
qi− j )
pG× c def= ∀ni=0 gpi ·c =∀ni=0(gpi )c
Completeness is straightforward and leverages the same concepts mentioned previously.
Evaluation is also pretty simple:
pG = (gp0 , gp1 , gp2) ∈G[x]
pG(x)= gp0+p1x+p2x
2 = g
∑n
0 pi x
i =
n∏
0
gpi ·x
i =
n∏
0
(gpi )x
i = gp0 · (gp1)x · (gp2)x2
As can be noticed, the multiplicative homomorphism requires that we use dlog to com-
pute the multiplication between any two elements of G. However, for security purposes,
the authors decided to integrate our polynomial-based fully-homomorphic scheme into
groups where the Discrete Logarithm Problem would hold. The alternative is to apply a
bilinear mapping in order to simulate (and obtain) up to one multiplicatively homomorphic
operation:
e :G×G→GT , e(ga, gb)= e(g, g)ab = gabt , gt = e(g, g),
〈g〉 =G, 〈gt〉 =GT
In particular, two choices were made:
1. Use an additive group with just one bilinear mapping. This effectively limits f to
only functions of 2nd degree, thus also eliminating the scheme’s previous universality
claim.
2. There are a couple of small changes to the group-polynomials’ definition when applied
to our HMAC scheme:
• r is actually calculated a little differently, as its dlog (calculated by the client)
is used instead; it should still hold as valid entropy source, see the paper for
more details[21].
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• the very fist coefficient of any polynomial pG (i.e. gp0 ), is actually set to p0. This
makes multiplication for two polynomials of first degree a little more efficient,
because
pG
def= (gp0 , gp1)
qG
def= (gq0 , gq1)
pG× qG = (gp0q0 , gp1q0+q1 p0 , gp1q1)= ((gp0)q0 , (gp1)q0 · (gq1)p0 , (gp1)q1)
= ((gp0)dlog(gq0 ), (gp1)dlog(gq0 ) · (gq1)dloq(gq0 ), (gp1)dlog(gq1 ))
= (e(gp0 , gq0), e(gp1 , gq0) · e(gq1 , gq0), e(gp1 , gq1))
becomes
pG× qG = (p0q0, gp1q0+q1 p0 , gp1q1)= ((p0q0, (gp1)q0 · (gq1)p0 , (gp1)q1)
= ((p0q0, (gp1)q0 · (gq1)p0 , (gp1)dlog(g
q1 ))
= ((p0q0, (gp1)q0 · (gq1)p0 , e(gp1 , gq1))
2.1.5.3 Amortized Soundness and Scalability
The construction of the HMAC follows the same idea as in the previous ones, so I will be
brief.
r = PRFK (L) (L is a full multi-label)
σx = InterpolateG((0,m)(sk, r))
Then, f (x) gets evaluated by mapping f to its counterpart f ′ using the group homomorph-
isms: σy = f ′(σx). And, finally, the check is the same because it leverages polynomial
evaluation within the additive group-polynomials:
σy(sk)
?= f (r)
Scalable Verifier in the multi-client or the multi-message construction, the idea is that all
L i have the same ∆, the Load function only takes 1 value, so its complexity is OV (1)
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2.2 Verifiable Delay Functions
Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) are currently a very active research area in the crypto-
currency community, but they have actually been around for a long time, with a formal
definition given only in 2018 by [24]. Until recently, researchers had been toying with
many different constructions, trying to find adequate “time-lock puzzles”. In 1996 Rivest et
al. [25] introduced a mathematical problem which seemed to exhibit interesting properties,
with relation to time delaying functionality, previously only briefly considered in naïve
PoW-like schemes by researchers such as Merkle [26].
The main objective is to come up with a cryptographic proof of elapsed time, i.e. a delay.
Researchers figured that a universal reference for measuring the passage of time could
be represented by the maximum speed at which a single operation can be processed on a
circuit (of any kind), so they set out to find “sequential functions” – i.e. which could only be
computed on a single cpu core one operation at a time. This idea can be seen as a PoSW,
“Proof of Sequential Work”; we will discuss later the implications for this construction.
Once such a “time-lock puzzle” (or PoSW) was found, the need emerged for an efficient
verification mechanism, to relieve the Verifier from the burden of wasting the same amount
of time as the Prover just to check that he did indeed compute the right result. This would
allow for efficient outsourcing of elapsed time, which may sound like a useless tool, but
it can lead to surprisingly innovative solutions in the time-agnostic world of computer
science. Attempts to find such verifier scalable PoSWs lasted for years, with some improved
but incomplete results in 2015 [27] and 2018 [24], culminating with two complete solutions
that same year by Wesolowski [28] and Pietrzak [29].
The recent rush of new research in this field is probably due to the increased popularity
of Blockchain technology (see use-cases in Section 2.2.2), and a formal definition for these
systems was finally given by [24] under the new name “Verifiable Delay Functions”. We
will be mainly considering Wesolowski’s scheme in this section, with some references to
Pietrzak’s. A good comparison of the two schemes is also provided in [30].
2.2.1 Utility
The issue of time synchronisation has long plagued electronic computers which interact
on the Internet. To solve synchronisation between honest parties, a hardware clock (or
constant delay networks) might suffice, but malicious parties would still be able to report
incorrect timestamps. Most importantly, the issue of time synchronisation also extends to
time delay proving. There are two main ways to detect such malicious attempts:
1. Distributed consensus mechanism.
This idea basically adapts the concept of a trusted third party to a scenario where no
such party exists (or at least it is not recognised as such by all honest parties).Trust
is distributed amongst all the parties (according to some satisfactory proportion or
relation), and the validity of a claim is based on whether it is the most supported one
by the network.
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In order for this system to work there needs to be a majority of parties incentivised
to act honestly, which is commonly achieved by distributing trust amongst a large
number of independently motivated parties, all interested in using the same protocol
(e.g. pseudonymous Bitcoin users participating from all around the world). Also, the
network itself needs to always be available to all parties (i.e. censorship resistant),
otherwise honest parties might be unable to stave off false claims by supporting only
the correct ones.
2. Use a universal time delay measurement reference.
This would be some sort of event occurring in our world which can be universally
verified just based on the laws of physics. The Prover would perform some sort of
action or operation over a period of time, and it would automatically reflect on some
object in the universe in such a way that it would be infeasible to replicate the same
exact object without the same period of time having elapsed.
Of course, these two systems can be combined into a single solution – Bitcoin makes
both use of the PoW system as well as the distributed consensus model – VDFs, instead,
take the second approach and try to find a trustless and convenient solution to measure
the passage of time.
A commonly proposed universal time delay source is “maximum computation speed”, as
in the fastest way that a specific computation can be performed in any implementation
of any computational model in the world. This is deemed as “universal” because, if no
participant in the world can perform a certain computation faster than the expected
amount of time, it can be used as a universal time delay reference for humans.
2.2.2 Use-Cases
VDF schemes are particularly interesting because reliable and efficient time delay out-
sourcing leads to innovative computer science applications. The original applications were
of cryptographic value:
• timed encryption: also known as “time capsules”, they would allow for self-
decrypting messages through a “timed key escrow” ([31], [32]) mechanism, where
a Trapdoor-VDF would reveal the key after some elapsed time. Timed encryption
can be leveraged to build scheduled payments: one could prepare multiple trans-
actions in advance, and they would self-decrypt in due time. At any moment prior
to the deadline, the owner can invalidate the payments. Timed encryption can be
used for many scenarios, such as timed top secret archives, in order to guarantee
security and transparency for a country’s intelligence services.
• timed commitments: using timed encryption as a building block, one can build
self-revealing commitment schemes[33], which can be used for lots of protocols,
including auction bidding: everyone commits during the first phase, and in the
second phase the bids self-reveal. Timed commitments can also be used for other
voting protocols, where the vote is revealed after the voting has taken place.
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• slow-timed hash functions: delay functions are interesting alternatives to classic
iterated hashing techniques and Key Derivation Functions, with the advantage of
being scalable and sequential. They can be used for password storage, when the
password are generated by humans, in order to stave off brute-force pre-image at-
tacks. Compared to classic techniques (such as scrypt), VDFs do not leverage memory,
instead relying on sequentiality. Initial slow-timed hash function constructions were
the precursors to what eventually became “Verifiable Delay Functions” in [24].
In practice, the ability for VDFs to generate public random numbers (when given a
biased entropy source) can be the basis for achieving Transparency in many other protocols,
such as a lottery. Over the last few years, there has also been increased interest in adapting
VDFs to cryptocurrencies, where the lack of a trusted third party is a common assumption:
• transparent public PRNG beacon: The main properties of random numbers is
that they’re both unpredictable and their generation is unbiased. Classic solutions
to generating public random numbers on the blockchain have been to either: take
block hashes, or use MPC computations [34]. The problem is that repeating MPC
computations is highly inconvenient (all parties must be online at the same time
and perform hefty computations), and that block hashes are subject to the biased
selection of transactions by PoW miners.
Using VDFs as “slow-timed hash functions”, we can generate random numbers on the
blockchain which remain secret for a short period of time. The main idea is that we
can use transaction history as an (unpredictable) entropy source5, and then remove
the bias introduced by miners by using VDFs. The VDF inputs are block hashes,
and the outputs are our random numbers: the miners can bias the inputs only up to
the block’s confirmation time (not just its publication), after which they cannot be
changed. If the VDF delay is longer than an input block’s confirmation time, then
the outputs will become unbiased because the miners won’t be able to evaluate and
change them at the same time. Of course, it is important to accurately measure the
maximum block confirmation time for the blockchain at hand, after which any miner
attack becomes infeasible, and set it to be smaller than the VDF delay.
• transparent lottery systems: much like Randomness Beacons, lottery systems
require the selection of a random number only after all relevant actions (i.e. the
betting) have taken place. The trick is the same, and players are given less time
to bet than it takes to figure out the random number, fixed at the beginning of the
computation by using block hashes. I’ve implemented a prototype trapdoor version
of such a protocol myself, on Ethereum Kovan[36]. Of course, the lottery game could
take advantage of a Randomness Beacon and just give players n blocks’ time to bet,
taking as winning number the Beacon’s output of the n-th block’s hash after the start
of the lottery.
5the entropy for a Bitcoin block hash (approx 10 minutes of transaction time) was estimated to be ≈ 70 bits
in 2015 by [35], and it is based directly on the difficulty of the mining problem. On Ethereum, blocks are
published ≈ 40 times more frequently (i.e. around 15 seconds per transaction) [34], which entails lower
entropy for each block hash.
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• improved blockchain efficiency: arguably one of the biggest issues cryptocurren-
cies have right now is the incredible waste of resources used for mining in PoW-based
blockchains. There are entire mining farms which combined consume as much energy
as a small country, all for the purpose of making Bitcoin run. The Ethereum2.0
research team is experimenting with PoS (Proof of Stake) consensus protocols, where
a new leader is randomly chosen to publish each block, without the need for wasteful
mining. VDFs can be used for this purpose because their output is deterministic, but
can still be used to choose leaders in a fair (pseudo-random) fashion.
Comparing the Nakamoto hash inversion puzzle (used in Bitcoin, BitGold, and
others) with VDFs, leader selection would be akin to fixing a PoW output from the
start, and then running many parallel processes to brute force the input space. The
advantage for PoW schemes is that they are verifier scalable, because other users
can quickly check that the correct pre-image was found. However, the price to pay for
fair currency distribution starting from a given biased state (i.e. the previous block’s
hash) is a non-deterministic search by exhaustion, which results in huge energy
consumptions. VDFs can remove the same bias present in block hashes, while still
being verifier scalable and deterministic. That’s because we fix the input instead
of the output, and then proceed sequentially with the computation: only one person
needs to calculate and publish the proof. This leads to a drastic reduction in resource
wastage, and is a highly anticipated feature of the Ethereum blockchain.6
Other interesting applications of VDFs have been identified for more ambitious scenarios,
such as Web3 and SWARM-like [37] solutions. An example is proof of “age”, where the
minimum age of a given file can be proven to show that some information was indeed
known ahead of time7.
2.2.3 A Language for Time (Delays)
But how to measure time in the time-agnostic world of computers? We could try to equate
cpu cycles and operations to the flow of time, measuring them with a real-time→µ-time
formula. There are a couple of issues with this approach:
1. µ-time 6= real-time
Algorithms are not an immediately useful tool for measuring time, since time runs by
itself and they don’t. Users might use our protocol for measuring time, but we cannot
ask them to run it indefinitely. This means that we need to adapt our language to
measuring time delays, and not time; as long as the algorithm runs, a delay will
6of course, the consensus protocol also requires incentivising users towards a unified blockchain state. In
PoW consensus protocols, miners are incentivised to mine for the longest chain, or they risk wasting time
and money; but in PoS consensus protocols, leaders can generate multiple chains without wasting any time.
One of the suggested solutions is to force cheating leaders to lose money, but the details are still being
fleshed out for Ethereum2.0.
7this can be regarded as the opposite of showing that a given file is recent, such as what what abductors used
to do when taking a photo of their captives along with the daily newspaper.
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be measured! We won’t be able to prove something like “this message at 13:54 on
1/1/2019”, but we might be able to prove something like “this message took one week
to process”. As long as the message is unique, we can also prove “this message is
from more than a week ago”.
2. µ-time 6= universal
The flow of time has the nice property of being the same for everyone: nobody can
speed it up or slow it down! However, this does not apply to computers – anyone with
more money can buy more processors, and then use them to parallelise and speedup
most computations.
For this reason, we aim to find sequential computations which cannot be parallelised,
such that money will not be a factor when measuring the flow of time; thus making
our protocol fair and transparent for all users.
Now that we’ve identified the main issues, let’s discuss the main properties that we
want for a statement X ∈ L:
1. Sequential
In order to build a reliable language for measuring time delays, we wish to base it
on sequential computations. This is because the time spent computing paralelisable
algorithms varies wildly according to the amount of money invested: a poor individual
with a single 10C processor will run a Bitcoin mining algorithm orders of magnitude
slower than a rich company with 1000x times the same amount of processors; this
makes for unreliable time delay measurement, hence unfair VDF protocols.The same
does not occur when comparing processor frequencies: average processors on the
market lie at around 1GhZ speeds, while the fastest ones in the world at 9GhZ – just
a factor of ten! As long as we account for maximum 10GhZ speeds in our sequential
computation, our delay measurements should apply to everyone: nobody will be able
to complete the VDF faster than the expected amount of time, although some might
take a little longer.
This solution, however, is not without flaws. An alternative to sequentiality, fre-
quently used in Cryptography for KDFs and password storage, has been to employ
algorithms which require using large amounts of memory in order to greatly increase
the cost for achieving parallelised computation. Two successful examples of this
are scrypt[38], commonly used for password-based key-derivation-functions, and
Ethash[39], used for the Ethereum cryptocurrency’s PoW. Another issue is with the
assumption that the difference between the world’s average processor speed and
the world’s fastest one is “small”, and that specialised hardware implementations
(e.g. ASICs) cannot improve this margin by a substantial amount. These assumptions
are currently being researched by the Chia Foundation and the Ethereum foundation
([28], [40]).
2. Deterministic
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Since we’re trying to measure effective time delays, and not average ones, our scheme
cannot rely on well studied PoW protocols. The issue being that they’re typically
probabilistic (as well as paralelisable): a problem with an estimated difficulty of 1
hour might end up taking 1 second, just out of sheer luck! A deterministic computa-
tion would give us a guarantee as to the number of performed computations, hence,
the minimum elapsed time.
2.2.4 Building a SPoW Protocol
The major idea behind the success of current VDFs is the specific protocol language
designed by Rivest et al. in [25], based on repeated squaring in RSA groups. This time-
delay language will become the basis for improved VDF protocols, here is its definition:
Time-Lock Puzzle TL(∆,λ,µ)
{
(x, y) | y←
T times︷ ︸︸ ︷
(µ◦µ◦ . . . ◦µ)(x),T ←∆ · sec
Ωµλ
, Ωy(∆),
T ∈Z,∆ ∈ seconds,µ : D→C, x ∈Dλ, y ∈Cλ
}
8
Rivest et al. [25] believed their language contained intrinsic sequentiality properties,
and based their “time-lock” protocol on it. Given the difficulty of estimating a function
(∆,λ)→T9, the puzzle was simply based on any T directly:
RSW96 TL(T,λ,µ){
(x, y, N) | y← x2T (mod N), µ= x 7→ x2 (mod N), Ωy(∆),
T ∈Z, N ∈R RSAλ modulus, x ∈Z∗N , λRSA derived from λ
}
10
Clearly, calculating a power 2T which is huge (e.g. T = 240) is not feasible, so we will not
be able to employ classic modular exponentiation techniques; two known techniques are
shown in the completeness proof. Here is the protocol we can derive from the language:
8in the practical scenarios, T is typically determined heuristically according to the specific implementation,
or based on concrete metrics of the basic µ operation. A typical example provided by most researchers in
their academic articles is T ← 240, however, concrete time measurements are not typically discussed.
9since there can be many other costs associated with usage of SPoWs (such as network transmission), they
are not well suited for precise time measurements. It’s best to choose delays which range from a few
minutes to hours or days.
10λ is the security parameter in bits for the RSA group. From λ we typically derive λRSA , according to
conventions based on statistical brute-force attacks shared by the cryptographic community. Today it is
believed that λ= 100 =⇒ λRSA = 2048, but this assumption may change in the future, or have changed
already.
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SPoW
Given

L≡TL(T,λ,µ)⊆ {0,1}∗ ∈NP
T ∈Z timing parameter
λ security parameter in bits
µ : squaring in RSAλ
N RSA modulus
And X ∈ L ⇐⇒ ∧
{
Complete
Sound
The protocol is clearly complete, since the repeated µ operation does yield a correct y:
Completeness
∀X ∈ L, (x, y, N)= X : Pr[y= x2T (mod N)]= 1
with the algorithm for computing y being:x
T group squarings︷ ︸︸ ︷
→ x2 → x22 → x23 → . . . →x2T (mod N) (order is unknown)
e← 2T (mod φ(N))∧ xe = x2T (mod N) (order is known)
11
(i.e. X ∈ L means that (x, y) are correct, and that Ω(T) time was spent. The second
algorithm for calculating y is particularly important, since it implies knowledge of
the RSA trapdoor and private key).
The actual soundness for this language’s claim to being a universal time-delay reference
(i.e. sequential and deterministic computation) is not proven, but it does rely on two
assumptions:
Soundness
∀X ∉TL(x) : Pr[y= x2T ]= negl(λ)
if cracking RSA is hard and all TL puzzles can only be solved in minimum T time
without φ(N) and X ∉TL but the puzzle solved means that it took less than T time,
then the puzzle was solved with φ(N), then the prover had to have cracked RSA,
11in a typical SPoW scenario, the RSA group order φ(N) is not known to the Prover.
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which has negligible probability! In order words:
Pr[∃"extractor" EPOLY :φ(N)←E(N)]= negl(λ)
∀x ∈Z∗N :Ωx2T w/out φ(N)(T ·µλ)(
X ∉TL∧ y= x2T =⇒ Ωy(<T ·µλ)
)
∧ =⇒
Ωy =Ωx2T w/ φ(N)(<T ·µλ) =⇒ ∃"extractor" EPOLY ⇐⇒
negl(λ)= Pr[∃E :φ(N)←E(N)]= Pr[y= x2T ∧w/out φ(N)]= Pr[y= x2T ∧X ∉ L]
The soundness of the protocol relies on the usage of groups of unknown order, and
the inability to reverse a cryptographic one-way function.12 In particular, two
assumptions are required for this protocol to work:
1. Cracking RSA is hard (i.e. extracting φ(N) from N)
This assumption has been upheld by the cryptographic community for decades,
only being proven invalid within the still developing context of Quantum Com-
puters.
2. There is no faster way to solve the puzzle w/out φ(N) than with Ω(T) sequential
RSAλ group squarings (i.e. µλ)
This was not proven in th original ’96 paper by Rivest et al.[25], but it is believed
to be true by all subsequent authors (inluding [27], [24], [29], [28] and others).
No specific construction for the protocol is provided13, but you could think of it as
something similar to Homomorphic Authenticators:
client V eri f ier
σx−→ server Prover
client V eri f ier
σy←− server Prover
check(σy)
?=True
or
V eri f ier
TL(T,λ,µ), N, x−→ Prover
V eri f ier
y←− Prover
y ?= x2T
2.2.4.1 A note on Trapdoor-SPoWs and Trapdoor-VDFs
So, whoever owns the RSA private key also knows φ(N), and can therefore
invalidate the protocol and spoof proofs at will. This does not preclude utility:
12we will discuss another groups of unknown order G(
pq) in the subsection on transparency Section 2.2.7.
13actually, [25] only states the language TL, and assumes that protocols based on its time-delaying sequenti-
ality will be sound. A construction is only provided for a timed encryption use case.
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the Prover may not be given the key anyway, or the trapdoor may be used to
generate “time-capsules”. In “time-capsule” constructions the owner of the
private key can take advantage of his Trapdoor-SPoW to quickly calculate
the output of a unique X ∈ L, and use it as OTP key to encrypt some secret
message: all others will have to wait before they can decipher his message.
At the same time, using RSA groups necessarily requires us to generate private
keys. If we wish for others to use our SPoW in a trustless (transparent) fashion,
what can we do to prove we did not keep nor use the private keys? We will
delve deeper into this topic in Section 2.2.7.
2.2.5 “Compressing” Time
Now that we’ve build our SPoW universal time-delay reference, we can proceed towards
refining it. While the protocol does allow us to prove time delays, it also requires the
Verifier to wait the same amount of time as the Prover (unless he has access to the RSA
trapdoor, which is not a scenario we wish to focus on). This can be a limiting factor for
computer applications, where performance is essential. If an auction lasting 1 hour takes
place between 100 participants we want the bids to be revealed as soon as the auction ends,
but our SPoW protocol requires each participant to wait 100 hours before they can be sure
of the winning party. Research into (verifier) scalable SPoW protocols, also known as VDF
protocols, has recently resulted in two competing approaches:
1. Cut-&-Choose:
Wesolowski came up with a proof [28] which shares some similarities with the
Schnorr Σ-Protocol. The idea is to “generate”14 many problems isomorphic to the
original SPoW, and then solve the one chosen randomly by the Verifier. Concretely,
the isomorphic problems are derived from the SPoW output, making sure that they
still preserve the protocol’s witness (i.e. that there have been numerous sequential
squarings starting form the input). This way, each available isomorphic problem
will be made dependent on the original SPoW problem, while having the property of
being much faster to check. When the Verifier randomly selects and validates one of
these isomorphic problems he can be confident that, as long as the check succeeds,
the Prover has surely waited the correct amount of time calculating the SPoW. The
“Cut & Choose” approach was perhaps first employed, informally, by Rabin in 1979
[41].
2. Recursive Cut-&-Choose:
Pietrzak came up with another innovative protocol [29] that instead shares similarit-
ies with the famous Graph-Isomorphism ZKIP feasibility result, in that soundness
is improved over multiple rounds of the protocol. The protocol makes use of an
intermediate execution trace derived from the SPoW computation, where each state
14we don’t actually generate all the possible problems in practice, but only the one that will be needed. For
the purposes of this discussion, however, it does not make any difference.
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is made dependent not on the input and output, but on another state that occurred
just a little earlier within the computation. When the Verifier recursively validates
these intermediate results, reaching the very first one, the proof becomes sound.
The protocol is still Cut-&-Choose, because during each round the Verifier can se-
lect amongst many problems isomorphic to the current state. While this technique
requires multiple rounds, increasing the verification costs, the prover overhead is
almost completely gone (unlike in the Wesolowski protocol). The use of an “execution
trace” to prove computations is also found in STARKs, analysed in Chapter 3.
We will be discussing only the Wesolowski VDF due to its verifier scalability; however,
the second one is just as valid due to its additional prover scalability improvement. The
interesting aspect of Pietrzak’s approach is that it is better suited for time-sensitive
scenarios (e.g. PRNG beacons), where the Prover wants to submit his result quickly and
the Verifier can spare extra storage for longer proofs. Other interesting but less successful
approaches are discussed in [24], and include making use of SNARKs (see Section 3.2), as
well as inversion of permutation polynomials, and modular square root constructions.
2.2.6 Building a VDF Protocol
To build an efficient protocol we need to find a problem that is isomorphic to our SPoW,
but which is also fast to check, or verifier scalable. Consider the main delaying factor in
the SPoW problem, x2
T
(mod N): the exponent 2T is way too large to compute and store
(for values such as T = 240), so we need to use our sequential repeated squaring method.
Likewise, if we choose another large exponent, the problem will stay the same. Say we
decompose our exponent into
∃r ∈R Zλ : 2T = q · r
Then, if we assume λ≈ 100, the value q is still very large15, and xq (mod N) is nearly just
as hard to compute as the original problem. So the new problem is of similar nature as the
old one, but is it isomorphic? Here’s the twist, we will use a different check function from
the one in our SPoW: instead of
x2
T ?= y (mod N)
We’ll use
(xq)r ?= y (mod N)
The idea is to have the Verifier randomly choose r after y has been submitted by the Prover,
and then wait for (xq) to be submitted by the Prover. Thus, the Verifier only needs to
perform one efficient calculation, and he can check whether the two values xq and y are
consistent with each other. This also has the effect of suggesting that a T-time time-puzzle
was solved, as we will discuss later in the soundness proof, but there are still a few details
to be ironed out before we can be satisfied.
15the symbol q is chosen in [28] because it the “quotient” for 2T /r.
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Two more security devices need to be added to this construction. The first deals with a
detail in the soundness proof, whereby we choose a prime random value r ∈R PRIME2λ
instead of a normal integer, which also changes the construction slightly because 2T =
q · r+residue. Intuitively, this gives the Prover more control over the check because he is
not only bound to values that might be unrelated to the SPoW (if the Prover is malicious),
but he can also factor in the input (e.g. xresidue, see below) of the SPoW to force xq to be
chosen correctly. For related reasons, [28] also requires that we modify our RSA group to
be RSAλ/{±1}. The second observation is more of a practical requirement: since inputs for
the SPoW should be unique and randomly chosen across different protocol executions, it is
better to remove the bias of the input x by calculating a new input x′←H(x), with hash
function H : {0,1}∗→RSAλ/{±1}.16 If this is not performed, any biased input x2 = xα1 can
be exploited to speed-up the computation by using a previous SPoW output and taking
advantage of the group’s commutative properties: x2
T
2 = (xα1 )2
T = (x2T1 )α = yα1 (mod N).
Finally, a note on efficiency — is it possible for the Prover to generate the auxiliary value
xq faster than using again the repeated squaring method, such as by taking advantage of
the relationship it has with x2
T
? In fact, it is, and [28] takes xq ← xb 2
T
r c (the flooring is due
to the prime divisor); algorithms are discussed in the completeness proof. Now that we’ve
discussed how to build the protocol, here is the construction for a V DF(x, y, N):
V eri f ier
y←− Prover
V eri f ier r−→ Prover
V eri f ier pi←− Prover
pirx′ residue ?= y
where

x′ =H(x)
y= (x′)2T (mod N)
r ∈R PRIME2λ
pi= x′b2T /rc
residue= 2T (mod r)
Completeness
∀(x, y, N)= X ∈V DF : Pr[pirx′ residue (mod N)= y]= 1
This is straightforward when expanding the formula:
pirx′ residue = (x′ b2T /rc)rx′ residue = (x′ q)rx′ residue
= x′ qr+residue = x′ 2T = y
16the hash function can be something like Keccak256[23], adapted to provide enough λRSA bits, such as by
iterating inputs through a counter in a PRNG-like construction.
34
2.2 Verifiable Delay Functions
And x′ q is calculated using
{
x′ q = x′ 2
T−residue
r = x′ 2
T−(2T mod r)
r = x′ b2T /rc←A (x′, r,T) (order is unknown)
x′ q, q← (2T −residue)r−1 (mod φ(N)) (order is known)
A is chosen to be the “on-the-fly long division algorithm”, with worst complexity
of O(2T), but an improved algorithm in [28] reaches O(T/log(T)), and can also be
parallelised.
Just as the SPoW, this protocol can be broken if the order of the group φ(N) is known
to the Prover. Trapdoor-VDFs are still useful, as mentioned before, when the owner
of the private RSA key is not the VDF’s Prover.
Soundness
∀X ∉V DF : Pr[pirx′ residue = y]= negl(λ)
if cracking RSA is hard, and breaking the Adaptive Prime Roots assumption is hard,
and X ∉V DF but the check succeeds means that either the Prover spent less than
Ω(T) time or he chose the wrong language parameters for (y,pi), then one of two
cases holds:
1. if the problem was solved in less than T steps then RSA was broken, which is
assumed to be improbable;
2. if the problem was solved with wrong protocol parameters (y,pi) and they’re
correlated by an exponent r in the check, then pi had to have been based off of y17
(see below for exact relationship) and the exponent removed (i.e. an exponent-root
was calculated), but removing any prime exponent requires calculating any
prime root for a value in the group, which breaks the Adaptive Prime Roots
assumption, which is assumed to be of negligible probability.
17pi was necessarily chosen after y because the relationship between the two requires a parameter r that needs
to be given by the Verifier, and an honest Verifier wouldn’t have continued the protocol without having
been given a y first. So y cannot be based off of pi in an attack against our adaptive protocol.
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In other words:
Pr[∃"extractor" EPOLY ∈ ITM :φ(N)←E(N)]= negl(λ)
Adaptive Prime Roots Assumption
⇐⇒ ∀α ∈RSAλ(N), α ∉ {0,±1}, r ∈R PRIME2λ :
Pr[∃"Extractor"E′POLY ∈ ITM : r
p
α (mod N)←E′(α)]= negl(λ)
∀x ∈Z∗N :Ωx2T w/out φ(N)(Tµλ)[
∀x′, y,pi ∈RSAλ(N)/{±1}, r ∈ PRIME2λ :
pirx′ residue (mod N)= y =⇒ pi= r
√
yx′ −residue (mod N)
]
[
X ∉TL∧pirx′ residue = y =⇒ (c1) Ωy(<Tµλ)∨ (c2) ¬(y= x′ 2
T ∧pi= x′ q)
]

∧
=⇒

Ωy =Ωx2T w/ φ(N)(<Tµλ)
same as SPoW soundness⇐================⇒ Pr = negl(λ) (case 1)
(y 6= x′ 2T ∨pi 6= x′ q)∧pi= r
√
yx′ −residue (mod N) (case 2)
=⇒ ∃α ∈RSAλ(N)/{±1} : y← x2Tα∧pi← xq r
p
α =⇒ ∃"Extractor"E′POLY
⇐⇒ negl(λ)= Pr[∃E′POLY ]= Pr[pirx′ residue = y∧ (y 6= x′ 2
T ∨pi 6= x′ q)]
= Pr[pirx′ residue = y∧X ∉ L]
The soundness of the protocol relies on the same assumptions as the SPoW protocol,
as well as the inability to find prime roots in groups of unknown order. In particular,
two assumptions are required for this protocol to work:
1. Cracking RSA is hard
2. There is no faster way to solve the puzzle w/out either breaking the underlying
SPoW time-lock puzzle, or breaking the Adaptive Roots Assumption. It is
an open question whether this assumption can be reduced directly to the RSA
hardness one, but it feels like a natural outcome and it would be a nice security
improvement.
There are two main attacks that the Adaptive Prime Roots Assumption takes
care of, when an attacker is targeting our VDF protocol. Let us also omit any
residues for the sake of keeping things simple. First, the attacker could guess
the expected Verifier’s choice of r, and subsequently choose a random value pi
and set y=pir. This is easily staved off by using a bruteforce-resistant security
parameter (e.g. 2256), for example based off of our RSA parameter 2λ≈ 200. The
second attack deals with the reason as to why we choose r to be prime, and not
just any random number from Z2λ. The reason is that if r turns out to be a
smooth-integer, then the attacker could choose y=αB, for random α and B the
product of many prime powers (up to some limit); then, pi= rpy=αB/r (mod N)
with B/r (mod φ(N))=B/r if there is no residue, hence there is no need to know
the group order to calculate the root because we don’t need to work within the
group. If the r is prime, then there is a really high probability that there will be
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a residue left, with an exception for the unlikely scenario where it is chosen to
be equal to one of φ(N)’s factors.
Scalability This protocol is fully succinct, because it is both verifier scalable
OV (pol ylog(T))⇐=OV (2 ·λ)=OV (2)
and it has a succinct proof
O|pi|(|x| =λRSA))⇐=O|pi|(1 ·λRSA+1 ·λ)=O|pi|(1 ·λRSA)
Specifically, the checking algorithm for the Verifier V only requires two (pir and
x′ residue) small RSAλ group exponentiations, which require respectively |r| and
|residue| group-squarings using the “square-and-multiply” algorithm, and a group
multiplication to put them together for the equality check. As for the messages
required to complete the proof, only pi and r need to be transferred, the first one is
just a group element and the second one is much smaller (due to the fact that λRSA
is derived from λ)
2.2.7 Eliminating Trust Issues
Now that we’ve achieved such a cool protocol, let’s address a final issue: how to make
multiple parties use the same VDF without fear of cheating? Alternatively, how to achieve
transparency?
The only construction we’ve mentioned so far, using RSA groups, clearly requires someone
to generate private keys which, as we’ve seen earlier, can be used to break the protocol.
What we really need are techniques to prevent anyone from owning the private key, so that
nobody even has the chance to cheat. Here are a three strategies discussed by [28]:
1. Alternative modulus generation: There is an approach to generating RSA groups,
presented by [42], which aims to completely skip the private key generation by
randomly selecting a large modulus which can satisfy RSA requirements with high
probability. If this modulus is indeed large and chosen randomly, nobody should be
able to extract φ(N) from it. While this method is the simplest and most efficient way
to patch our protocol, it does not always lead to correct RSA groups and it is believed
to severely damage VDF sequentiality requirements, leading to more efficient µλ
implementations. Thus, it might break SPoW soundness assumptions and cannot be
used reliably.
2. MPC-based RSA setup: a popular solution to solving trust issues is, as we’ve
discussed already, distributing trust. As it so happens, secure Multi-Party Compu-
tation protocols (e.g. Yao’s garbled circuits [43] and secret sharing with arithmetic
circuits[44]) would allow multiple participants to jointly generate a provably valid
RSA modulus, without leaking the private key to anyone; a technique for this is
presented in [45]. Such MPC-based approaches are practical enough that they were
also employed by the ZCash cryptocurrency [46] for its setup.
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Unfortunately, this method is secure only if at least one party in the computation is
honest, which means that all (independent) parties interested in using the transpar-
ent VDF protocol should participate in the setup phase, to be sure that it is trust-less.
However, in blockchain scenarios multiple parties join the protocol long after the
initial setup phase — which means that some degree of trust is involved. As long as
the number of (independent) parties participating in the MPC is a significant portion
of the total number of VDF users, this method is convenient and reliable.
Since MPC setups do involve the generation of secret random values, they cannot be
considered strictly transparent, according to the definition we gave in our VC model.
However, they do provide a strong form of trust reduction through distribution —
which is commonly cited as being the core of Bitcoin’s “trustless” design. We can
consider them to be a weaker form of transparency, perhaps called “trustlesness”.
3. Alternative Groups: a newer approach, given by [28] in his VDF construction, has
been to replace RSA with a trapdoor-free multiplicative group, also called “Class
Group of an Imaginary Quadratic Field” [47] (adaptation to RSA presented in [48]).
This approach promises to be uncompromising, since the group order is not known
even to the party setting it up. However, this method still requires someone to
generate the public parameters, so there is an assumption to be made: no other
setup procedure for these groups needs to allow for a Trapdoor, so either the known
setup procedure is the only one available, or any other procedure cannot leak the
group order. Given that these groups have not yet been sufficiently studied by the
cryptographic community, this method can be considered to be less reliable. It is,
however, a very interesting topic for future research, and it provides an innovative
solution to the problem at hand.
2.2.7.1 A note on VDFs as transparency enablers
Given that VDFs can be used to build trustless Randomness Beacons, and that
these short-term18 random numbers can be used to setup other cryptographic
protocols in a transparent fashion, it is imperative that VDFs themselves be
transparent as well. However, one does not need to go overkill with the setup
procedure — if the protocols which make use of the Randomness Beacon have
less or equal security requirements than that of the VDF (i.e. the number of
participants in the MPC phase is still significant compared to the total number
of users of the protocol), the MPC setup procedure is still good enough for their
purpose. In fact, there are current plans [40] to implement a blockchain-wide
VDF for the Ethereum cryptocurrency, rather than as an isolated third-party
instance, such that all the “smart contracts” (i.e. subprotocols) running within
Ethereum already lie within its security requirements.
18i.e. they cannot be used, once revealed, for new protocol executions; for example, in a lottery system you may
only use numbers which have will be revealed after the bidding phase is over. Because of this, you will
need to keep using “fresh” beacon outputs.
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2.3 Conclusion
We’ve seen two very powerful techniques for building VC protocols: (1) arithmetisation,
used in Homomorphic Authenticators for outsourcing small-degree computations; (2) inter-
activity and randomness, used in VDFs for “compressing” computations and measuring
time. It is my belief that while many non-universal VC protocols have been considered
as part of separate fields, we should try to converge them under the domain of Verifiable
Computation, to compare them and understand the most efficient designs behind specific
cryptographic VC properties. Such designs can later be abstracted and employed for
building more expressive protocols, as demonstrated by the execution trace idea found
in both Pietrzak’s VDF protocol and many other Universal VC protocols (e.g. STARKs),
discussed in the next chapter.
Unfortunately, and due to time constraints, this chapter only barely scratches the surface
of all non-universal proof protocols that have been built over the past decades, so I leave
as an open question the analysis and unification of the remaining ones. To motivate the
reader in that direction, allow me to acknowledge other very interesting and influential
systems:
• Sigma Protocols: Σ-Protocols is the field representative of traditional Zero-
Knowledge Interactive Proof systems, which were developed decades ago with
the intent of building more practical constructions through the use of relaxed VC
properties. This is an extensive field, focusing primarily on public key authentication,
seeing the likes of the famous Schnorr Identification and Signature scheme.
Protocols from this field share many properties with the universal proof systems
discussed in the next chapter. The Ring-based Learning With Errors scheme found
in [49] is an interesting recent development in this field.
• Proof of Work: this field was made popular by the deployment of the Bitcoin
cryptocurrency, which uses it for its transactions (i.e. proofs). A lot of research
from the cryptocurrency communities has gone into extending this field with more
efficient constructions, resulting in improved consensus solutions for decentralised-
trust protocols. A notable evolution of this field is VDF protocols, which we analysed
in this chapter.
• (RSA) Accumulators19: this interesting field, whose protocols implement very
efficient operations for checking membership of an element in a set, typically makes
use of hidden order groups (e.g. RSA). Such constructions can also support other set
operations, such as union and intersection. This field comes closest to implementing
the universality property found in Universal VC schemes presented in the next
chapter. Fun fact: Zerocoin, the precursor to the Zerocash protocol that the Zcash
[46] cryptocurrency implements, was actually based upon RSA Accumulators.
• Attribute Based Encryption (ABE): such systems take advantage of user identit-
ies to establish public key pairs, which offers the big advantage of being able to send
a single message to a specific hierarchy of users without needing to collect many
19an interesting starting point for the reader might be [50], which offers a systemisation of this field, including
constructions not based on hidden order groups.
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different keys. The use of a public authority (i.e. Trusted Third Party) is typically
required, and almost all such systems employ homomorphic encryption, used to build
complex relationships between messages and identity attributes.
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A revolution in the applicative world of cryptography, first with Blockchain technology and
now with Zero-Knowledge proofs, has been developing over the last decade. The success
achieved by these protocols is starting to spark excitement, in the hopes that it could
change not just our societal functions (e.g. cryptocurrencies vs traditional fiat money), but
also the way we interact online and develop software. The main goal of these efforts has
been that of developing innovative cryptography to help us regain trust in a trustless world,
to help us base all our communications on verifiable statements: to build a “Proof of All”.
So far we’ve discussed the basic building blocks for cryptographic proofs, and how spe-
cialised protocols can be designed to handle private or computationally-sensitive scenarios.
One common characteristic, and potential downside, of using such non-universal protocols
is that adapting them to particular use-cases requires technical know-how; compromises
(in terms of VC properties) are often also required to retain efficiency or privacy. In this
chapter we will be taking a step towards an uncompromising solution, and the jack-of-all-
trades when it comes to Zero-Knowledge proofs, Universal VC protocols. These systems do
not only protect the privacy of their users, but they can also guarantee the integrity of any
computation. Because such protocols can be used to generate proofs based on any other
program, automatically and without much technical know-how, I call them Universal
Proof Compilers.
The focus of the chapter will be understanding and designing the fundamentals of a
protocol which marks a breakthrough in the field of VC technology: zk-STARKs. While
this construction is fairly recent, it is the result of many years of research and has already
been well received by the cryptographic community. This system is the first concretely
efficient (i.e. suited for realistic usage) Universal VC compiler that is also post-quantum
safe, and does not require any form of trusted setup (i.e. it can be used out-of-the-box,
unlike zk-SNARKs). Towards the end of the chapter we will also mention alternative
systems to zk-STARKs that have been developed in recent years.
3.1 zk-STARKs
What are zk-STARKs? Glad you asked:
• zk, as in zero-knowledge and privacy-preserving;
• Scalable, or efficient, as proving requires little increased overhead, generated proofs
are relatively “small” (or acceptable) in size, and verification takes exponentially less
time than executing computations naïvely (i.e. almost instantly, even for very heavy
ones);
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• Transparent, as in there is no requirement for a trusted setup, like in zk-SNARK
systems;
• ARgument, as in a computationally secure cryptographic proving scheme achieving
completeness and soundness for a specific language;
• of Knowledge, as in based on statements with relation to publicly known information
(see more in Section 3.1.2.1).
But most importantly of all, (zk)STARKs are Universal Verifiable Computation systems.
Unfortunately, these definitions are not sufficient to build or understand such systems. The
construction by Ben-Sasson et al. presented in [51] is fairly complex, filled with engineering-
specific details (the protocol was designed to be concretely efficient), and overall tough to
digest even for cryptography students. For these reasons, and following the goals of the
thesis, I chose to focus on design principles, foregoing formal proofs in favour of a simplified
understanding. In this section I will break down the core concepts of zk-STARKs, showing
how a general purpose computational-integrity statement can be converted into a proof.
In Section 3.1.1 I will give an overview of how we’re going to approach building a
STARK. Each step of our design represents a problem instance that abstracts the following
step, thus providing a useful overview for breaking down STARKs. By taking a stricter
mathematical formalisation of the initial problem statement and following the given
reduction steps, it is possible to synthesise the protocol into a single statement, comparable
to that provided within the original paper.1
Each later subsection will present: the main objective of a universal VC system (Section
3.1.2); the intermediate arithmetisation process required to break down normal com-
putations into usable components (Section 3.1.3); 2POLY , the name I give to the core
subprotocol used by STARKs to implement a VC proof (Section 3.1.4); concrete performance
results achieved by STARKs through interactivity, and security (i.e. soundness) assump-
tions (Section 3.1.5); the privacy extension to convert STARKs into zk-STARKs (Section
3.1.6); FRI, the subprotocol used by 2POLY for probabilistic degree testing (Section 3.1.7).
3.1.1 The Main Design
The single most important tool which is used by all known Universal V.C. systems is
that of arithmetisation. It is the process of converting a question on the integrity of
a general purpose calculation into a mathematical statement which we can manipulate
through cryptographic means. For zk-STARKs this is the polynomial comparison problem,
for their zk-SNARk predecessors it is quadratic arithmetic programs, but similar ideas
arise in all the competing universal VC protocol systems, exhibiting varying approaches:
homomorphic cryptography, multiparty computation, probabilistic checkable proofs, and
interactive proofs. The original problem statement provided here is reduced (not without
any assumptions, as we will see later) to an algebraic statement on polynomials, for which
1the original paper in [51] also formalises and takes care of multiple engineering optimisations, which I only
briefly touch upon later on. These details can be considered to be essential for the implementation of a
practical STARK and are an important contribution to the achievements of the paper, as well as the basis
for the official open-source implementation provided by the authors in [52].
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we actually have a working cryptographic protocol. It is the final problem of polynomial
comparison on which we will focus our cryptographic tools deriving from PCPs and IPs,
the rest is mostly arithmetisation.
First, we will informally introduce the main problem of Computational Integrity and
Privacy which we are trying to solve (Section 3.1.2); then we will perform a few arithmet-
isation steps which bring us closer to a formal statement on polynomials (Section 3.1.3);
then, we will present the core polynomial comparison and proximity testing protocols used
by zk-STARKs (Section 3.1.4).
Here is an overview of the problems addressed by our design, in increasing order of
specialisation:
Arithmetisation
Step Problem Description VC Benefit
1 Generic Statement Was the output of this
computation, within
the specified
time-frame, correct?
Universality
2 Computational
Integrity&Privacy
Statement
Is it true that Out-
put=Program(Input)
within T steps?
Universality
3 Algebraic Problem f (x) ?= y, O f (T) Universality
4 Execution Trace
Algebraic Problem
ee
?∈C ,
ee execution trace,
C constraints,
|ee| =T+1
Soundness (2POLY
call format),
Scalability
5 Polynomial
Comparison Problem
f (x) ?= g(x),
( f , g) ∈ F[x],
deg( f )= deg(g)
Soundness (check),
Zero-Knowledge,
Scalability
(engineering
optimisations),
Transparency
3.1.2 Original Problem Statement
We’re looking to build a system which can represent any VC problem, i.e. a “Proof of All”
system; before building it we need to define it, in order to state our requirements and
boundaries. The researchers behind zk-STARKs provide a language to define any trustless
computation, called Computational Integrity and Privacy (CIP) problem statements.
Such statements represent the state of the art of what current cryptographic proof systems
can achieve in any computational model.
First off, let’s clarify the name “computational”. With this name, we simply wish to allow
the system’s users to make statements regarding any sort of general purpose computation.
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The universality property of our VC model suffices to satisfy this requirement. Here are
the main properties defining CIP problem statements:
1. Integrity
In order to trust the output of a specific computation, we need to consider that a
Prover may be incentivised to cheat. We can think of income tax statements, for
example, where a citizen is trying to perform tax evasion by submitting false claims
regarding his income. To prevent this, and to trust the validity of the Prover’s claim,
we need to somehow “bind” the computation’s output to the actual requirements
of the computation. I also informally consider this to be the binding property of a
CIP statement, and it can be accomplished through the completeness and soundness
properties which we defined in our VC model.
2. Privacy
What happens if the output of a specific computation can be revealed, but not its
input? Consider a scenario in which I’m buying drinks at a bar and I need to provide
identification to the bartender, so that he may check that I am of legal age to drink
alcohol, but I do not want to reveal anything else about my age, name, nationality,
height, or gender. To allow a Prover to make such a privacy-friendly claim, we need
to somehow “hide” our computation’s inputs (i.e. my personal details, in the given
example) from the Verifier. I informally consider this to be the hiding property of a
CIP statement, and it can be accomplished through the VC model’s zero knowledge,
transparency, and post-quantum safety properties.
The transparency requirement is necessary in contexts where I want anybody to be
able to verify my claim, at any point in time, without the need for a trusted setup
phase. Post-quantum resistance is also important in any cryptographic system meant
to stand the test of time, thus becoming a reliable standard for the protection of data
many decades (if not centuries) down the road.2
3. Efficiency
Along with the previous two fundamental properties, Ben-Sasson et al. mention this
additional and more practical requirement. We are concerned with the realisation
of concrete systems, which can be used under realistic and fair conditions, using
hardware that is commonly available to any average Prover or Verifier.
Assume you’re tasked with extracting all the facial images of people passing through
an airport on a specified date, and then matching them against a known-criminals’
database, as part of a police investigation. You wish to provide the list of matches as
evidence for a court hearing, but the court is skeptical of your work and wishes to
double-check the results. If the computation took 20 hours to complete, will the court
need to take just as long to verify your statement?
2note, the main assumptions made by zk-STARKs are: (1) the existence of cryptographic One-Way hash
functions; (2) the Random Oracle Model. These assumptions are amongst the oldest to exist in cryptography,
and they have defied all sorts of cryptanalysis, including recent Quantum computer developments.
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Universal zero-knowledge proof systems of the past were actually very burdensome in
this regard, easily requiring terabytes of memory for even the simplest calculations;
the most efficient proof systems were Sigma protocols, but they were only appropriate
for very specialised computations. To make our system actually usable, we need
to somehow reduce its impact to be minimal for the Prover, and actually even
convenient (i.e. much faster than normal execution) for the Verifier. With regards to
the communication complexity of our system, it should stay within acceptable levels
of Internet communication.3 To realise this CIP property, we will have to implement
multiple properties of our VC model: prover scalability, verifier scalability, proof
succinctness, and non-interactivity4. With regards to non-interactivity, it is an
important efficiency measure because it allows using our system even when neither
party can communicate at the same moment. The proofs can be batched in advance,
and sent off for inspection at a later time.
Finally, we can formalise our system’s language to be
CIP Is it true that Output=Program(Input) within T steps?
⇐⇒
{
(P,T, x, y)
∣∣ y= P(x), “Program” P ∈ ITM, OP (T steps)}
5
A state-of-the-art system proving that X ∈CIP needs to implement the following VC
properties:
• universality (it’s intrinsic)
• completeness
• soundness
• zero-knowledge
• scalability
Additionally, zk-STARKs also implement
• non-interactivity
• transparency
• post-quantum safety
3for example, proving a single CIP statement typically requires the transfer of a few hundred bytes with zk-
SNARK systems, and a few hundred kilobytes with zk-STARK systems. Considering that a CIP statement
can be used to further compress other CIP statements, both complexities are acceptable even for repeated
use in space-sensitive environments, such as decentralised Blockchains.
4the main strategies we will use to get all these properties are: (1) arithmetisation; (2) random querying. In
alternative systems, such as zk-SNARKs, homomorphic encryption is also used, with a boost in efficiency
but a loss in privacy (specifically, transparency).
5“steps” here represents a state change within the program. When comparing with other systems, it is useful
to convert a step to the number of CPU cycles that are required for each state change after converting the
program into a binary circuit. If it is hard to identify a specific state, then every single instruction can be
interpreted as a step, with the state being the totality of the program’s variables.
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3.1.2.1 A few notes on Program Specifications
I would like to take a moment to debate on the utility of CIP statements in real-life
scenarios. In general, the problem we’re trying to solve is not always related to a specific
program, as much as it is to a specific computation:
Generic Statement was the output of this computation, within the specified time-frame,
correct?
Given such a generic requirement, it may not always be necessary to start execution
of a STARK from the CIP statement of a binary program. The requirements for the com-
putation may, in fact, already be defined by human generated program specifications,
which document the desired functionality of the program being analysed. While such
documentation is often seen underdeveloped (or lacking) even in the biggest software
projects – since unit test-cases are a cheaper alternative – it can still serve as a concise and
efficient definition for the core functionality of a specific computation. In fact, it allows us to
skip the CIP’s binary program conversion phase, and directly use our program specification
for the intermediate arithmetisation phases.
Here are two example scenarios, one which appeals to program specifications and one
which appeals to CIP statements on binary programs:
• Copyright-Protected Streaming: a cloud provider’s technician is tasked with adding
DRM to their video streaming service, in order to comply with a recently approved
European Copyright Directive. The only issue is that the service specialises on
streaming encrypted videos, as an added privacy benefit. The technician immediately
thinks to use his favourite zero-knowledge universal VC proof system, zk-STARKs,
so as to retain privacy of the streams and minimise the impact of the new feature
on the service’s performance. In this scenario the constraints are very simple: each
source file needs to be checked against a list of blacklisted files, then it is encrypted
and checked against the corresponding stream.
While the technician could write a program to do this, compile it, and send it over to
the clients so that they can generate CIP-based proofs, there are several downsides:
(1) waste of resources, as developing and deploying consumer-level applications can
take a lot of man hours; (2) bugs, as traditional testing does not typically guarantee
that the security specifications are met by the program with a high degree of certainty;
(3) performance hit for the clients, because full arithmetisation of a stateful binary
program can lead to much more complex constraints and larger execution traces
than is really necessary, also leading to bloated proof sizes; (4) last but not least is
security, because the users are asked to trust that executing a binary program will
not compromise the confidentiality of their files6.
A much smarter solution is that of taking advantage of appropriately documented
program specifications for the requirements of the DRM feature, and sending those
6note that even if the program was released as open source, it still takes a much longer time to analyse
thousands of lines of code (also including libraries) rather than just a few lines of specification requirements.
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off to the clients in a standardised format. The streaming service’s users can then
take advantage of trusted zk-STARK implementations to build proofs based upon a
very small set of constraints.
• CTF Challenge: in “Capture The Flag” competitions, participants typically take part
in jeopardy-style cybersecurity games where they must solve multiple challenges
to score points. One popular category of these challenges, known as “Pwning”,
requires that participants discover a vulnerability hidden somewhere within a given
program; to verify that a player has exploited the program successfully, instead of
just manually bypassing the security checks through binary editing, the program is
uploaded to a sandboxed server and players are restricted to feeding it input through
an internet socket.
In all common recurrences of this scenario, a few issues arise: (1) a server with high
computational and bandwidth capacities needs to be rented to host the vulnerable
program; (2) the vulnerable program also needs to be sandboxed or virtualised to
protect the server’s integrity, leading to further impacts on computational require-
ments; (3) in case of oversights made during setup of the sandbox, the server itself
may become vulnerable, leading to a potential compromise of the whole competition7;
(4) some malicious actors may choose to carry out a DoS attack on the server by
overloading the vulnerable program with continuous inputs, leading to an abrupt
end of the whole competition.8
In this specific scenario, applying STARKs using the CIP binary program statement
makes perfect sense. There is no need to apply zero-knowledge (HTTPs is probably
sufficient), but there is still a desire to verify knowledge of the vulnerability in a very
short time-frame, and without potential compromise of the server. Furthermore, the
requested knowledge directly relates to a specific stateful program execution, so it
makes sense to arithmetise that same program along with its every nook and cranny.
Thanks to STARKs, CTF competition maintainers could host challenges at a fraction
of previous costs, without worrying too much about security of the hosting server.
3.1.2.2 A note on Zero-Knowledge Statements
In this section, we regarded the input x of a program as part of the CIP language statement.
Truthfully, things are a little different when we consider the need for zero-knowledge. With
zero-knowledge we actually aim to hide the input x, so it cannot be part of the statement,
it will instead be part of the witness. At the same time, having a statement of the form
zk-CIP {
(P,T, y)
∣∣ ∃x : y= P(x), “Program” P ∈ ITM, OP (T "steps")}
7a well justified concern when dealing with participants whose expertise is cybersecurity and penetration
testing, actually!
8another common recurrence in CTF competitions. . .
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does not always equate to a proof of knowledge. For example, proving that a number is
composed of prime factors and proving that these factors are known constitute two entirely
different ordeals. Because of this, typical zero-knowledge CIP statements aim to prove
knowledge of a secret through a publicly known element (that we’ll call h instead of x).
This public input should uniquely identify the secret, without revealing any information.
The most popular way to do this, with an computationally indistinguishable amount of
information revealed, is through a cryptographic hash function H:
zk-CIP of knowledge{
(P,T,h, y)
∣∣ ∃x : y= P(x)∧h=H(x), “Program” P ∈ ITM, OP (T "steps")}
9
This simple solution is also useful for authenticating users based on their public keys or
other forms of public data that constitute a unique reference to the secret.
NOTE: when performing such proofs, it’s very important to take into consideration hash
functions that are better suited to the algebraic nature of STARKs. This is due to the
complexity that arises when arithmetising such “functions” which are typically optimised for
real processors. Because of this, the authors of the paper opted to make use of a Davies-Meyer
AES-based hash construction ([51], [53]), which offered better performance compared to
SHA2 when used in the binary fields that their polynomials were based upon. This concept
also applies to the 2POLY and FRI protocols that we will see later, due to the requirement
of a commitment scheme.
3.1.3 Intermediate Arithmetisations
The first important step to take is that of turning our problem statement on binary inputs,
outputs, and programs into a statement on algebraic objects. In particular, the most
difficult aspect of this transition is that of converting a stateful binary program into a
function. In the original paper this is performed through a series of complex engineering
steps called APR (Algebraic Placement and Routing) reduction, where the whole state of
the program is also abstracted, including RAM and networking10. For our purposes it will
suffice to assume that we have already converted, perhaps thanks to well-defined program
specifications mentioned in Section 3.1.2.1, CIP statements into the following Algebraic
Problem:
AP1 {
(x, f , y,T)
∣∣ f (x)= y, O f (T), f : D→C}
9formally, it might actually be more correct to place all constraints inside the program, so that they can be
considered to be part of the arithmetisation steps needed for a STARK: P ′(x,h) def= {y= P(x)∧h=H(x)}.
10of course, applying the APR to real programs running on MacOS/Linux operating systems and Intel/AMD
processors is not yet realistic, so the researchers provided a proof of concept in [52] using a simple RISC
virtual machine called TinyRAM [54].
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We can now stop our process for a moment, to reflect on what it means to achieve a
protocol with scalability. In the context of IP proofs, the Prover comes up with a randomised
problem that is isomorphic to the original one, which allows revealing the witness under
masked disguise. But even if we were to forego zero-knowledge and reveal our witness
directly (the input x), it would still take the Verifier O f (T) steps to check our AP1 problem
statement, which is just as long as naïve execution and so it precludes verifier scalability.
VDFs are another family of protocols which is similar to STARKs, because they are
also trying to make really long computations become efficient to verify. For the VDF
construction by Wesolowski [28], the choice of an isomorphic problem is justified because
the specific algebraic properties of the chosen problem lead to powerful relationships that
are efficient to verify, leveraging the security provided by RSA groups. But in our scenario,
we are dealing with generic computations which may not possess such neat algebraic
properties, so we cannot take advantage of such shortcuts. The construction by Pietrzak
[29], instead, offers an approach that is a step closer towards the right direction. The idea
is to explicitly expand the witness of the given problem into an execution trace, resulting in
an isomorphic problem that allows the Verifier to randomly and efficiently inspect parts of
the computation. Each state within the trace can be queried, and, with some randomness
and smart recursion, the boundaries of the trace are checked without relying on clever
isomorphism assumptions. We will take a similar approach of expanding our witness
input x into an execution trace leading up to y, and our burdensome computation will be
reduced to a few constraints with complexity much lower compared to that of the original
execution. Because of this, I call the technique witness expansion and constraint
compression. We will leave the “randomness and smart recursion” counterpart to the
2POLY subprotocol, which will leverage interpolation and proximity testing to obtain
prover and verifier scalability.
The new problem can be regarded as checking an execution trace against one or more
constraints:
AP2 {
(ee,C ,T)
∣∣ ee ∈C , C "Constraints", |ee| =T+1,deg(C )¿T}
To define what constraints are, and for the sake of simplicity, we can consider two case
scenarios:
1. Domain-based constraints: each of the elements of the trace must satisfy a specific
set-membership condition. This can be useful in very simple scenarios where we just
want to check whether each element of a list lies within a given domain.
2. Polynomial-based constraints: this scenario is more realistic, and it considers the
requirements that a normal program would have. They can be represented as
polynomials, taking as input one or more execution states.
We will elaborate on reducing these two scenarios to a 2POLY problem in the following
subsections.
49
3 Universal VC Compilers
NOTE: a single state of the execution trace defined above can be composed of multiple
variables, especially when extracted from a binary program. The authors of the paper
handled this case efficiently by considering each variable separately, splitting a single
execution trace into multiple Reed-Solomon codes; this allows for notable space savings after
interpolation, and the trace evaluations can later be joined through a linear combination.
3.1.3.1 Domain-based Constraints
Let’s assume to have been given the following problem:
∀x ∈D : f (x) ?∈C ,
with |C |¿ deg( f ), f : D→C
Where C is precisely the domain constraint, and f is the function indexing an execution
trace. Our main objective is to reduce the original statement to a comparison between two
polynomials ( f ′, g′):
f ∈C ?⇐⇒ f ′ = g′
First, we shall convert the set membership constraint to a vanishing polynomial, where
True values for the membership relationship end up evaluating to zero:
∀x ∈D : C( f (x))= 0
C(y)
def= (y−C [0])(y−C [1])...(y−C [|C |−1])
Unfortunately, this equation is not yet sufficient, because it is bound to a specific domain.
We will see later on that the 2POLY subprotocol needs to work on domains which can be
extended, so we must expand the domain of our inputs to span over all the integers.11 To
help us do this, we can recall a useful theorem:
Th. Vanishing Polynomial Composition it is always possible to extend the domain of a
univariate vanishing polynomial through (de)composition:
∀x ∈D : P(x)= 0
⇐⇒ ∃P ′ :∧
{
P(x)= ZD(x)P ′(x)
deg(P)= |D|+deg(P ′)
with ZD(x)
def= ∏
i∈D
(x− i)
(note: ZD is also common notation to denote a polynomial vanishing on all of the
domain D. The polynomial P ′ can be extracted by the prover by interpolating P and
calculating P/ZD .)
11as mentioned previously, the optimised variant of STARKs actually works with specific fields. More on this
later.
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We can now extract the full polynomial:
∃P ′ : C( f (x))= ZD(x)P ′(x)∧deg(P ′)= deg(C)−|D|
And reduce to a 2POLY problem:
∃P ′ :

f ′(x)= g′(x)
deg( f ′)= deg(g′)
f ′(x)=C( f (x))
g′(x)= ZD(x)P ′(x)
We’ve discussed reduction to polynomial comparison, and we know that the 2POLY
protocol will take care of efficient comparison. However, the the scalable version of 2POLY
would have the Verifier defer querying (for a point i) f ′(i) and g′(i) to the Prover, which
would only guarantee that two random polynomials given by the prover are equivalent. To
make sure that the domain (i.e. ZD) and codomain (i.e. C) constraints are respected, and to
retain constraint soundness of our CIP problem, the Verifier needs to call the 2POLY
protocol using a special format:
C( f (i))= ZD(i) ·P ′(i)
where the underlined parts are provided by the Prover, and the rest is calculated by
the Verifier. This type of check still retains scalability, because C is of low-degree by
assumption, and we now show an efficient technique for evaluating ZD .
NOTE: in the original paper, the authors actually work with polynomials with domain
taken from multiplicative field subgroups, in order to optimise vanishing polynomial
evaluations:
ZD(x)=
∏
i∈D
(x− i) ∧D ⊆ (F,×)
Th.Lagrange=⇒ ZD(x)= x|D|−1 ∧ x ∈ F(
⇐⇒ ∀i ∈Z|D| : ZD(gi)= 0 ∧〈g〉 =D
)
with
Th. Lagrange
(G,×) =⇒ ∀x ∈G : x|G| = 1
This improves polynomial evaluation times from O(|D|) to O(log(|D|)) thanks to the
square-and-multiply algorithm for multiplicative field exponentiation.
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3.1.3.2 Polynomial-based Constraints
In this more realistic scenario, we will check whether a specific execution trace ee follows
the given program constraints:
ee ∈C , ee : D→C
C = {CBOUNDARY , CEX ECUTION }
deg(C )¿ deg(ee)
CBOUNDARY can be considered to be the boundary constraint polynomial (or list),
which identifies the value that specific elements of the execution trace need to have;
for example, the first/last elements might correspond to specific input/output values for
a given CIP statement. CEX ECUTION can be considered to be one or more execution
constraint polynomials, which define relationships between intermediate execution trace
states; typically, they are one or more state changing functions.12 Let’s start with the
necessary definitions for these constraint functions.
CBOUNDARY : DB →C
DB ⊆D
CEX ECUTION : CE →C
CE ⊆Cdeg(CEX ECUTION )
And we can now start defining the constraint relationships:
∀i ∈DB :CBOUNDARY (i)= ee(i)
∀(i prev, inext) ∈DE : CEX ECUTION (i prev)= ee(inext)
DE ⊆Ddeg(CEX ECUTION )+1
As can be noted, the domains for these functions only apply to a subset of the execution
trace. This is evident when we consider that boundaries apply typically only to specific
elements of the trace, and state changing functions apply to a specific pattern of elements
in the trace (e.g. subsequent states).
Just like we did for domain-based constraints, we can convert the relationships to
vanishing polynomials:
∀i ∈DB : CB(i)= 0
CB(i)
def= CBOUNDARY (i)− ee(i)
12I will only consider one state changing function, but there can be multiple; I will later make considerations
on joining two (or more) constraint polynomials.
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∀i ∈DE : CE(i)= 0
CE(i)
def= CE(i prev, inext)=CE(i1, ..., ideg(CEX ECUTION ), inext)
=CEX ECUTION (ee(i1), ..., ee(ideg(CEX ECUTION )))− ee(inext)
We can now expand the domain using the same theorem on vanishing polynomials that
we used previously:
∃P ′ : CB(i)= ZDB (i)P ′(i)∧deg(P ′)= deg(CB)−|DB|
∃P ′′ : CE(i)= ZDE (i)P ′′(i)∧deg(P ′′)= deg(CE)−|DE|
Thus, obtaining two distinct 2POLY problems:
∃P ′ :

f ′(x)= g′(x)
deg( f ′)= deg(g′)
f ′(x)=CB(x)
g′(x)= ZDB (x)P ′(x)
∃P ′′ :

f ′′(x)= g′′(x)
deg( f ′′)= deg(g′′)
f ′′(x)=CE(x)
g′′(x)= ZDE (x)P ′′(x)
NOTE: the authors of the paper don’t actually call 2POLY twice for these two statements,
but they define a randomised (by the Verifier) linear combination to join them all together
and check them at once. This is especially useful, considering that there may be multiple
execution constraints, each detailing different conditions on successive execution trace
indexes.
Finally, the same domain and codomain constraint soundness considerations men-
tioned in Section 3.1.3.1 apply here. The call formats for 2POLY are:
CBOUNDARY (i)− ee(i)= ZB(i) ·P ′(i)
CEX ECUTION (ee(i1), ee(i2), ...)− ee(inext)= ZDE (i)P ′′(i)
with i = (i1, ..., inext) ∈DE
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3.1.4 The Polynomial Comparison Problem
All of our efforts so far can be seen as having one main goal: reducing everything to the 2
polynomials’ comparison protocol presented in this subsection. This is because this protocol
satisfies two main properties that we’re after, and that are typically harder to achieve in a
universal proof system: scalability and zero knowledge13
How does this problem take form? Essentially, the Verifier is given (the evaluations of)
two polynomials and asked to verify whether they’re equal or not. We want to do this in
the fastest way possible. Here is our typical language definition:
2POLY(F) {
( f , g)
∣∣ f (x)= g(x)∧deg( f )= deg(g)= d∧ f , g ∈ F[x]}
14 or just {
( f , g)
∣∣∀i ∈D : f (i)= g(i), f : D→C, g : D→C, |D| = d+1}
For now, we will assume that the polynomials (i.e. lists) are of the same degree, and we
will focus on building a protocol to check their equality; Section 3.1.7 will take care of the
degree check. The first approach the Verifier can take to solving this problem is just naïve
comparison:
∀i ∈D : f (i) ?= g(i)
This method gives us perfect soundness, but it also takes O(d+1) steps to run. Assuming
that each polynomial is an extremely long execution trace, this check would force the
Verifier to waste too much time, thus precluding verifier scalability from our final solution.
We can do much better by slightly increasing the soundness error, the same way
that PCPs (Section 1.2.1) employ “probabilistic checks”. Let us, then, consider the error
probability of checking the polynomials against just a single element of the domain, which
I will call “succinct query”. The error occurs on any index which makes our check succeed,
in spite of having two different polynomials; here is an example with the errors highlighted
in red:15
x
1 2 3
1
2
3
f (x)
g(x)
13universality is another important one, but that’s precisely what we achieve through our problem reductions!
14You will notice that we’re using polynomials with coefficients taken from a field, this is useful for efficiency
optimisations that we will outline later. For now, just consider all elements to be integers.
15again, note that in this plot the polynomials map to real numbers, but they will be part of a field when used
for real programs.
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We can see by the plot that the size of the errors space is much smaller compared to
the rest of the domain, but is it really the worst case scenario? Thankfully, there is a
well-known theorem regarding polynomials which can answer this question:
Th. Polynomial Comparison two differing univariate polynomials of degree d are equal
in at most d evaluation points.
Now we have all the necessary information to calculate the error rate of a succinct query:
Pr[error] ⇐⇒ Pr[X ∉ L∧ check(X )=True]
⇐⇒ Pr[( f , g) ∉ 2POLY ∧ prob_check( f , g)=True]
⇐⇒ Pr[ f (x) 6= g(x)∧∃x0 ∈R D. f (x0)= g(x0)]= d|D|
NOTE: an alternative way to visualise this problem, and leading to the same probability,
can be seen as the application of the Schwartz–Zippel Lemma [55]–[57] to probabilistic
polynomial identity testing.
So, our error rate is dependent on the degree of the given polynomials, and the size of
the domain they’re evaluated on. In order to decrease this ratio, we have two available
methods:
1. Compress the polynomials: to decrease d, we need to replace our lists with equivalent
alternatives of lower degree. In the given 2POLY problem this is not possible because
the lists are given as is, but within the STARK context the polynomials actually
relate to execution traces. Each element of a trace can be anything, as long as it
complies with the given constraints – it may also contain irrelevant local variables,
after being extracted from a complex program! Carefully crafting such execution
traces can result in a reduction of their size, and of our polynomials’ degrees. Another
technique is that of carefully interpolating the execution traces: the authors of the
paper convert an execution trace to multiple Reed Solomon codes, obtaining further
compressions because each local variable is considered separately!
2. Add Redundancy: to increase |D|, we need to increase the space from which we can
pick our succinct queries. To do this, we can simply have the Prover give polynomial
evaluations over a domain that is much larger than their degree, and this easily be
obtained through interpolation.
Since the second method can always be applied to our 2POLY problem, we can always
apply it to obtain any desired soundness error ²:
²= d|D| =⇒ |D| =
d
²
This protocol will be completed with the FRI protocol in Section 3.1.7 for checking our
original assumption that the two polynomials have the same degree.
NOTE: the approach of adding redundancy can also be applied to to probabilistic polyno-
mial comparison using directly coefficients instead of evaluation points, with an even better
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soundness error. The basic idea is to multiply both polynomials with a random polynomial
of large degree, thereby spreading out single coefficients across multiple ones.
NOTE2: it is also possible to use multiple dependent queries to further improve the
accuracy. Care must be taken to respect the zero-knowledge requirements described in
Section 3.1.6.
3.1.5 Scalability through Interactivity
We’ve discussed just how we can have precise but succinct polynomial identity tests with
just a single evaluation point, but how do we evaluate this point? The polynomials need
to be interpolated to add redundancy, how much is this going to cost us? It’s time to
reveal the trick that has made so many proof protocols successful: interactivity. Thanks to
interactivity, the Verifier can ask the Prover for auxiliary information with regards to the
original problem, without compromising the actual integrity or privacy of the statement at
hand. Any good interactive protocol makes use of a Cut&Choose technique (like the one
discussed in Section 2.2.5), where the Prover sends over an alternative representation of his
original problem, after the Verifier has made his choice. In the scenarios discussed within
STARKs, the original problem is typically a polynomial evaluated on a specific domain,
and the choice of the Verifier is a single point within that polynomial. In traditional
non-universal proof schemes, it is common for the researchers to seek out an alternative
representation of the original problem that is: (1) isomorphic to the original one, (2)
randomise-able, and (3) that does not reveal anything about the original problem’s witness
(whenever it is a non-deterministic secret fixed by a public key or hash function). An
example of this can be, in Schnorr protocols, the task of finding a masked private key
dependent on the original secret, or, in the Wesolowski VDF, the adaptive prime roots
assumption used to request a randomised exponentiation strongly coupled with the original
one.
In STARKs, however, we do not have access to such isomorphic problems for universal
CIP statements that also inherently bind the Verifier’s choice to the original statement.
Because of this, to make sure that the Prover does not cheat based on the Verifier’s selection,
we ask the Prover to make use of a Commitment Scheme to bind the original problem
statement to the Verifier’s choices:
1. Commit
the Prover commits to each possible evaluation of the interpolated polynomial on
the required domain. Each evaluated point will be kept hidden by the Commit-
ment Scheme (due to its “hiding” property), which is useful for the Zero-Knowledge
extension discussed later. This step is the “cut” part of the Cut&Choose technique.
2. Query
the Verifier chooses one (or more) point(s) from the polynomial that he would like to
query. This step is the “choose” part of the Cut&Choose technique.
3. Reveal
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the Verifier opens the commitment for the requested points, revealing the requested
evaluation; because a Commitment Scheme is “binding”, he will not be able to change
the value of the evaluations that were committed in the first step (as the Verifier
would notice and abort the protocol).
Thanks to this neat trick, the full domain of the evaluated polynomial will be kept
consistent by the Prover, otherwise either the reveal step or the subsequent soundness
check required by the protocol will fail.16
There are still a few details to iron out:
• Who interpolates the polynomials? The Prover interpolates the polynomials using
their original domain (e.g. the execution trace) and evaluates them on the domain
defined in the 2POLY subprotocol (which in practice can be quite large, and at least
100 times larger than the original domain for 99% soundness accuracy). Interpolation
and evaluation was combined into a single process using a state-of-the-art quasi-
linear time algorithm for Reed-Solomon codes based on additive-FFT techniques,
described in [58]. This also produces our quasilinear scalable prover VC property,
having OP (T log2 T)17.
• What is the communication complexity? While the Verifier only needs to request a few
points to be evaluated on a specific domain (with values at most of size |F| = 64 bits),
the commitments made by the Prover take up as a large amount of such values. This
can lead up to as many as |D′| ·64 bits, with |D’| being easily x100 or more times
the size of the original domain (such as the size of the execution trace). This is not
practical for the Verifier to store, and imposes a huge strain on communications.
Because of such issues, the authors decided to rely on the Kilian-Micali ([59], [60])
“argument compiler” for PCPs18, which basically uses a Merkle-Tree [61] (whose
leaves are the Prover’s evaluation points) as basis for the Commitment Scheme,
sending just a single hash value (i.e. the tree’s root) as commitment. However,
each revealed evaluation (i.e. leaf of the tree) also needs to verify the commitment
using an “authentication path”, which is basically a tuple of the necessary hash
values required to traverse and validate the Merkle-Tree from the revealed leaf
up to the tree’s root. If we assume that we’re using a cryptographic hash function
H : {0,1}λ× {0,1}λ→ {0,1}λ, the final proof ends up becoming a succinct proof for its
size complexity: O|pi|(#queries · (log(|F|) bits+pathlen ·λ bits))
plus FRI≈ O|pi|(log2 T).19
16that is, as long as the check is truly sound. See the bottom of this subsection for a discussion on soundness
assumptions for STARKs.
17T is the same as the one discussed in the CIP problem statement.
18the improvement made by Micali was for the non-interactive version of the protocol.
19the left summand refers to the size of each queried and revealed point, the right summand refers to the size
of each authentication path required to validate the revealed point (the path is logarithmic with relation to
the total number of elements); complexity is also affected by the FRI subprotocol described later, yielding
the squared logT result.
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Finally, in the case of the FRI protocol for low degree testing, there will be multiple
polynomials to commit to, so multiple Merkle-Tree roots will have to be used and
authenticated.
• What Commitment Scheme to use? Commitment Schemes are typically built using
some randomness and a cryptographic hash function, SHA2 or Keccak is a typical
choice. In STARKs, it turns out that using using SHA2 was too costly for the
arithmetisation, so they used the same Davies-Meyer AES-based construction [53]
that we mentioned earlier (Section 3.1.2.2).
Thanks to all of these efforts, as well the requirement on low-degree constraints C
(Section 3.1.3), and taking into consideration the FRI subprotocol discussed later, we are
also able to achieve verifier scalability for OV (log2 T). For a concrete comparison with
zk-SNARKs, we have approximately 1/10th proving time, half verification time, and 100 to
1000 times the proof length.
On a final note, let us consider the security assumptions that we require for a full
zk-STARK proof, leading to a transparent and post-quantum safe system:
1. Existence and availability of cryptographic one-way Hash Functions
2. Validity of the Random Oracle Model (ROM) (only for the non-interactive variant)
3. Existence of a ZK Argument of Knowledge Statement (Section 3.1.2.2)
4. Public Randomness Source (for transparency)
3.1.5.1 The Non-Interactive variant
Non-interactive STARKs were proven to exist using the ROM model, which is performed
using the traditional Fiat-Shamir heuristic [12] shown in our model ([Section sec. 1.5);
but keep in mind that it reduces our perfect zero-knowledge scheme to a computational
zero-knowledge scheme.
3.1.6 Adding Zero-Knowledge
Let us now turn the page to what is probably the most captivating feature of zk-STARKs:
perfect zero knowledge! Shockingly, and with great distinction from previous schemes
based on homomorphic cryptography (e.g. zk-SNARKs), it is actually the easiest property
of the protocol to achieve. To see why, we need to pay respects to our adamant use of pure
polynomials, and to the shoulders of giants on which our 2POLY subprotocol stands upon:
Reed-Solomon codes and Shamir’s Secret Sharing.
Reed-Solomon [62] codes originated in the 60s, with the objective of introducing error
correction functionality to error-prone communication links. Their main success was
realising that redundancy can be used to efficiently describe polynomials and detect errors
with a very small overhead, a notion which granted us our verifier scalability. The codes
relied on a well known theorem on polynomials:
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Th. on Polynomial Interpolation A univariate polynomial of degree d is uniquely defined
by ≥ d+1 points.20
At the same time, Reed-Solomon codes offered a solid theoretical foundation for secret
sharing in the 80s, when Shamir’s Secret Sharing [63] scheme was introduced. The main
idea is to hide a secret in the very first element of a list, which is itself the evaluation of a
polynomial of degree d on an arbitrarily large domain21. Each different element of the list,
except for the first one, is distributed to a group of trusted users; when at least d+1 users
come together, they’re able to recover the secret through Lagrangian interpolation.22
The nice feature about Shamir’s scheme is that it is information theoretically secure,
because not even computationally unbounded attackers with access to ≤ d shares can
retrieve any information on the secret. This serves as a foundation for our zero-knowledge
property, here is the protocol extension:
1. Deny Querying the Execution Trace: the Verifier is not allowed to perform queries
from the execution trace’s original domain, as any of its values may contain traces of
the original witness (i.e. the input x). Likewise, in Shamir’s scheme the first element
of the evaluation list, typically containing the secret, is never shared.
2. Introduce Randomness: the execution trace is extended with uniformly selected noise,
equal to as many elements as the number of queries performed by the Verifier.
This is performed because preventing the Verifier from querying the original domain
of the execution trace is not sufficient to achieve zero-knowledge. While the same
concept of Shamir’s scheme applies – in that owning less than degree +1 (i.e. |ee|)
evaluations is not always sufficient to recover the full secret (i.e. ee) – the same
context does not. Specifically, in Shamir’s secret sharing at least d elements of
the original polynomial are uniformly selected random values23, so each possible
interpolation of a degree d polynomial from d points is equally likely24, making it
perfectly hiding. In our scenario, instead, we cannot assume that at least #queries
intermediate states are uniformly random, as the opposite is often true because
these states tend to be dependent on each other or take a particular shape/form with
non-uniform probability. Because of this, some possible interpolations of a degree
deg(ee) polynomial are more likely to occur, leading to a leakage of information for
each query provided to the Verifier.
20The theorem is also evident when considering that d+1 evaluations can be put into a system of equations
containing d+1 variables for all the polynomial’s coefficients – solving the system leads to the correct
solution.
21the evaluation typically starts from zero, so the coefficient of degree zero for the polynomial is simply the
secret, and all other coefficients can be selected randomly from the same domain of the secret.
22as we discussed in Section 3.1.5 the authors of the paper actually take advantage of more efficient interpola-
tion algorithms.
23this is a direct result of the fact that at least d coefficients of the degree d polynomial are uniformly selected
random values.
24if the polynomial is part of a field F[x], then there are |F| possible polynomials, all with the same probability
of being correct
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In order to prevent these “partial interpolation” attacks, however unlikely they may
be, we can simply append #queries uniformly selected random values to the original
execution trace. Not only does this provide perfect zero-knowledge (as in Shamir’s
scheme), but it still retains soundness with regards to the given STARK execution
and boundary constraints. To see why, consider that the constraints only validate the
domain of the original execution trace, so any noise added outside of that domain is
still acceptable. This can also be easily deduced by considering the lack of restrictions
on the contents of the polynomial P ′ found in the theorem on vanishing polynomial
composition that was presented earlier (Section 3.1.3.1).
3.1.7 The (Low) Degree Testing Problem
One important condition of the 2POLY protocol, and the secret behind its scalability, is
the requirement “deg( f )= deg(g)= d”. In fact, knowing the degree of a specific polynomial
allows for great optimisations, such as those seen in Reed-Solomon [62] error-correction
codes and Shamir’s Secret Sharing [63] scheme. The authors of the zk-STARK paper came
up with a protocol for validating a stated degree, called Fast Reed-Solomon Interactive
Oracle Proofs of Proximity, or FRI (presented in [64]).25 The key innovation of this protocol
is providing a concrete Proximity Testing Protocol, made possible through the use of
Interactive Oracle Proofs (IOPs) and other engineering optimisations. In this subsection, I
will discuss how a PCP for degree testing can be made scalable through interactivity.
First things first, let’s start with the complex name: (1) the protocol is fast, in that
it is concretely efficient and can be used for practical purposes (e.g. STARKs); (2) the
problem statement is based on Reed-Solomon codes; (3) the method to solve the problem is
a combination of IP and PCP proof methodologies, called IOP; (4) we do not test for equality
with a specific degree, but for proximity.
The reason that the problem needs to be relaxed to proximity testing is that it is actually
quite hard to achieve a concretely efficient protocol for checking degree equality, so we relax
our assumptions a little bit. We transform our part of the 2POLY statement on degrees
from something of the form deg( f ) = deg(g) = d to something like deg( f ) ≈ deg(g) ≈ d;
to be exact, through use of Reed-Solomon codes we can make our statement become
deg( f ) ≤ d ∧ deg(g) ≤ d without loss of soundness precision for the 2POLY protocol.
However, the actual result deriving from our implementation will lead us to two statements,
to be checked separately, based on proximity to d: deg( f )≤ d+d0∧deg(g)≤ d+d0 (for
some “small” d0 based on d). As we will discuss later, the reason that we have d0 proximity
is because FRI gets more reliable, in cases of malicious Provers, as the distance between
the polynomial’s real degree and d gets larger; because such proximity statements can
only guarantee that the tested degree will be close to (or less than) d, they are called
“low” degree testing problems. For practical purposes the concrete distance between d and
d0 is typically low26, and, to accommodate for this inconvenience, we can easily increase
25a variant of FRI with improved soundness, called DEEP-FRI and which we will not be discussing here,
was recently published in [65]
26i.e. |d0| ≈ 1−ρ
1
4 in FRI [64], and ≈ 1−ρ 12 in DEEP-FRI [65], with ρ being the compression rate for the RS
code that is found in the FRI problem statement, mentioned formally later.
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precision of the 2POLY test by increasing the degree to d+d0.
We can now move onto the formal problem language that this subprotocol tests:
FRI {
( f ,d)
∣∣ f ∈RS[F,D,ρ], f : D→C, d = ρ|D|, (D,C)⊆ F}
RS[F,D,ρ] represents all Reed-Solomon codes mapping to a field F and evaluated on
a space D (i.e. code redundancy length is |D|) and whose compression rate is ρ. In
short, we’re stating that deg( f )< d; one can easily turn it into deg( f )≤ d′, d′ = d−1.
How do we go about tackling this problem? If we use a naïve check to get the degree
of f we must interpolate it on the full domain D, but O(|D|) complexity is far too costly.
Improvements were made in the 90s [66] to bring the test complexity down to O(d+1)
as long as we were testing for proximity, and further improvements with regards to this
problem were carried on in the field of PCP proofs. We shall further improve this result to
O(log(d)) with 3 simple steps. The core innovation of the FRI protocol is that of improving
upon the traditional PCPP (PCP of Proximity) tests through IOPP (IOP of Proximity); the
main idea is to send multiple proofs (or oracles, when queried through the Prover) to the
Verifier, which reduce the problem to a simpler one over time. Here are our steps:
1. Reduce f to a polynomial f ′ of degree deg( f ′)= deg( f )/2
2. f ← f ′, go back to step 1 and repeat for log(d) steps
3. Check that f is of degree 0
In order to reduce f to f ′, we take advantage of a decomposition technique that shares
similarities with the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm [67] for error correction of Reed-Solomon
codes, and is exactly the same one used by the divide-et-impera Cooley-Tukey algorithm
for the (inverse) Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [68]. The idea is to split the polynomial
between odd and even coefficients, each becoming its own polynomial of degree half of the
original one:27
f (x)=
deg( f )∑
i=0
f i · xi
=
deg( f )/2∑
f2i · x2i+
deg( f )/2∑
f2i+1 · x2i+1
=
deg( f )/2∑
f2i · x2i+ x
deg( f )/2∑
f2i+1 · x2i
=
deg( f )/2∑
feveni · (x2)i+ x
deg( f )/2∑
foddi · (x2)i
= feven(x2)+ xfodd(x2)
27we will assume, for simplicity, that the domain D of f be 2-smooth (i.e. ∃k ∈N : |D| = 2k); the degree of f is of
the same form.
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Now, let’s consider an auxiliary “composition” polynomial g(x, y):
f (x)=∀(x2 = y) : feven(y)+ xfodd(y)
=∀(x2 = y) : g(x, y)
Whenever x ∈D is mapped onto y by squaring, we shall call that domain D′, such that
y ∈D′. The polynomial g has the important property of being derived from f and being
decomposable into smaller degrees, degx(g)≤ deg( f )/2 and deg y(g)≤ 1, this can easily be
visualised if we abstract away one of the variables:{
gx = g0+ x · g1
g y = feven0 · y0+ ...+ fevendeg( f )/2 · ydeg( f )/2+ g0( fodd0 · y0+ ...+ fdeg( f )/2 · ydeg( f )/2)
Because of such considerations, |D′| = |D|/2.
We can now generate all the polynomials for our 3-step plan:
f (i)
def=

f (0) ←∀x ∈D : f (x)
∃x0 ∈ F : f (1) ←∀y ∈D(1) : g(0)(x0, y)
∃x1 ∈ F : f (2) ←∀y ∈D(2) : g(1)(x1, y)
...
∃xlogd ∈ F : f (logd) ←∀y ∈D(logd) : g(logd)(xlogd, y)
(with g(i) decomposition of f (i), |D(i+1)| = |D(i)|/2). Assuming, in the honest case, that
deg( f )= d, clearly f (logd) will be be of degree 0: a constant repeated up to |D(logd)| times.
When we apply the Kilian-Micali construction for interactive PCPs, we will have the the
Verifier generate (uniformly randomly) and send points xi, and the Prover generate and
commit the list of evaluations for each f (i); evaluations can be calculated either by evaluating
the decomposed polynomial on y for x= xi, or just by interpolating the g y shown above using
deg( f (i))/2 points of the form (α, f (i)(α)). This process is also called the commit-phase in
FRI.
Now that we’ve seen how to validate deg( f ) by checking that it reduces to a constant
function after log(d) steps, how dow we check consistency of that final constant value?
We should check that each transition made by the Prover is actually correct, traversing
through each polynomial one-by-one in a way that is totally similar to the Pietrzak VDF
[29] technique that we mentioned in the Intermediate Arithmetisation section. We will also
be doing so efficiently through a succinct querying of each polynomial f (i), called “oracle” in
the IOP model that FRI is based upon; this second part of FRI is called the query-phase.
The main idea is to check (for each round of our 3-step process) that a polynomial f reduces
to a polynomial f ′ correctly:
f ∈RS[F,D,ρ] ?=⇒ f ′ ∈RS[F,D′,ρ]
To check for consistency, let’s try to reduce f ′ to some other polynomial:
f ′(y)≡ g(x0, y)
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Unfortunately the Verifier cannot afford to directly interpolate g(x, y)= f (x), nor can he
afford to interpolate g y, but he can afford to interpolate gx for some value y0:
∃y0 ∈D′ : g(x, y0) ⇐⇒ ∃(α0,α1) ∈D, y0 ∈D′ : Interpolate
[
(α0, g(α0, y0)), (α1, g(α1, y0))
]
Which can be reduced to f (i.e. ∀x2 = y : g(x, y) = f (x)) quite easily when we query two
“related” points from f :
⇐⇒ ∃α ∈D, y0 ∈D′,α2 = y0 : Interpolate
[
(α, g(α, y0)), (−α, g(−α, y0))
]
⇐⇒ ∃α ∈D, y0 ∈D′,α2 = y0 : Interpolate
[
(α, f (α)), (−α, f (−α))
]
Therefore, we end up with the following succinct consistency check by having the
Verifier query from the Prover f ′(y0), f (α), f (−α):
f ′(y0)
?= g(x0, y0)= Interpolate
[
(α, f (α)), (−α, f (−α))
]
(x0)
(with α2 = y0)
Finally, the actual soundness analysis (i.e. precision) for this consistency check (and the
whole FRI protocol) is the toughest part of any IOPP or PCPP protocol, and something that
we will not get into detail. Suffice to say that as long as the Prover is honest the protocol
works just fine, and when he lies about the degree of f the protocol works very well when the
real distance of deg( f ) from the claimed degree is large (because the soundness probability
is based on a function of the distance). When this distance is small, the FRI protocol
cannot reliably detect it, but it is a very small distance (which was already improved in the
DEEP−FRI [65] extension) and we have mentioned above how the 2POLY protocol can
be easily adapted for this issue by increasing its precision. Furthermore, the protocol can
be considered concretely efficient, with OP < 6 ·d, OV < 21 · log(d), O|pi| < 2 · log(d).
NOTE: degree testing in this section is fully pq-safe, but in other proof systems
(e.g. SNARKs) it is typically based on homomorphic encryption.
NOTE2: the protocol should be applied to both 2POLY polynomials to check that they
are of the right degree, but the authors of the paper take advantage of the fact that any
linear combination of the two polynomials leads to the same degree as one of them, so they
check just a single composite polynomial.
NOTE3: the authors of the paper actually discuss improving both performance and
soundness of the protocol by adjusting the values in the Merkle tree of the Kilian-Micali
commitment in such a way that a single subtree will contain both points (αi,−αi), and that
further down the tree we also find the other points (αi+1,−αi+1) in such a way that we can
re-use f ′(y0), leading to very efficient authentication paths for the commitment scheme. It is
an open question whether better commitment structures than Merkle trees can lead to more
improvements, such as reduced communication sizes O|pi|.
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3.2 Conclusion
zk-STARKs are an incredibly powerful tool that can be used not only to build privacy-
friendly applications, but also to drastically reduce the computational costs required to
validate outsourced computations online. In short, the power of such universal compilers
is that of being able to answer any sort of yes/no question:
• Do you have the right password?
• Do you have the right password for user John?
• Do you have the authority and balance to perform a transfer of EUR 100 towards
John?
• Were these 1000 images analysed using the Machine Learning model I gave you?
• Does your result comply with the Smart Contract we uploaded to Ethereum?
• Does my program meet security specifications, implying that it is free of bugs?
And such answers can be checked by the Verifier in time that is much, much faster
compared to simply (and naïvely) analysing all the required data himself. When the
proposed question takes this binary format, the privacy of any needed data can be preserved
by the protocol as long as there is access to other public and binding data published
by some trusted authority (e.g. hashed citizen identities published by the government)
or computationally inherent to the question’s context (e.g. a known composite number
uniquely defined by its prime factors).
While we’ve seen the current state-of-the-art in the domain of VC systems, let’s take a
moment to consider constructions that have been developed using alternative approaches.
The majority of such systems derive from the older and quite alike fields of cryptographic
protocols: IPs (Interactive Proofs) and PCPs (Probabilistically Checkable Proofs), or altern-
ative approaches with comparable semantics. Within the context of constructions stemming
from PCPs, there are two common solutions for solving degree testing of arithmetic circuits:
(1) multiplicatively homomorphic encryption (e.g. zk-SNARKs) and (2) proofs of proximity
(e.g. zk-STARKs). While all these competing systems are part of the cryptographic VC
domain (most of them also being very recent), they can be grouped into different fields
according to their theoretical design:
• MPC in the Head: this is the only other field, apart from STARKs, which achieved
both transparency and post-quantum safety. The main idea behind of such protocols
is that of simulating independently (i.e. “in the head”) a Multi-Party Computation
(MPC), and then revealing it to the Verifier upon request. Amongst the most popular
constructions there are: ZKBoo [69], ZKBoo++ [70], and Ligero [71];
• zk-SNARKs: this is currently the most successful field of VC protocols, with multiple
open-source libraries available to the public and even a successfully deployed privacy-
friendly cryptocurrency, Zcash [46]. SNARKs [72], traceable back to SNARGs [73]
and typically based on QAPs (Quadratic Arithmetic Programs) and homomorphic
cryptography, have received a lot of attention from researchers, giving birth to many
theoretical designs such as: Geppetto [74], Pinocchio [75], Groth’s [76] (most popular
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one), SNARKs for C [77], and very recently Aurora [78], Sonic [79], and Libra [80]
(most interesting due to its linear prover complexity);
• zk-STARKs: this very innovative solution was groundbreaking due to all the VC
features it implements, and for being valid even in realistic scenarios, it is published
in [51];
• Interactive Proofs for Muggles: this “older” (compared with other protocols)
design by [81] is one of the few which is based on IPs rather than PCPs; Hyrax [82]
is an interesting recent development.
• Linear PCPs while this DLP-based (Discrete Logarithm Problem) field is not strictly
universal, as proofs can only guarantee that given inputs lie within a specific range
(e.g. boundary constraints), Bulletproofs [83] have often been compared to other uni-
versal systems because of their applicability to cryptocurrencies (they were developed
for the Monero [84] cryptocurrency) and their (now outclassed) performance.
On a final note, most of the recent research in this field has been published with consider-
ation for applicative scenarios, especially Blockchain-based solutions, by providing library
implementations and concrete performance analyses. Amongst the most successful applic-
ations based on such research we find the privacy-friendly cryptocurrencies Zcash [46] and
Monero [84], and privacy-friendly smart-contract (e.g. Ethereum programs) outsourcing
and decentralised exchanges in ZEXE [85].
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